Whitewash

The New York Times and Harper's magazine have both published reports on how the Pentagon used senior retired military officers as surrogates to not only shape the news with seemingly authoritative commentary but to "flood the zone with information” and achieve “information dominance.” Particularly after the above-the-fold New York Times story, criticism of the Pentagon program grew and the Pentagon was compelled to investigate. The Department of Defense Inspector General has published its examination of the charges on January 14th. While the report reflects a significant amount of work, the result is what government officials often understand as C.Y.A. At every turn, intentions and practice are interpreted favorably. The reports dismisses the idea that the program amounted to a "propaganda" campaign, and makes the far-fetched claim that the high-level briefings and privileged access offered to the retired brass only provided info that the retired officers could have readily have garnered by asking friends still in uniform. (Fair disclosure: I know and respect several of the retired senior officers involved in the stories. The problem with this program, which did entail doses of propaganda, is not just that the Pentagon provided privileged access to those who would "carry its water," as one Public Affairs official noted, but that the media was tacitly complicit in turning air space over to "approved" experts.)

See the Jan. 14, 2009, report.

"We consider unlikely the possibility that an RMA obtained some type of competitive advantage for a DoD contractor simply by participating in the briefings arranged as part of the Pentagon outreach program. With rare exception, information was unclassified and available for release in the public domain. It was provided openly to numerous outreach communities, not selectively to the RMAs. In our view, any “inside information” that RMAs might obtain would reasonably have been provided to them as a result of their senior rank or continuing liaison with former military associates, rather than through OASD(PA).

Similarly, any influence in the DoD acquisition process that RMAs might seek to exercise on behalf of private entities would largely depend on their expertise, entree conveyed by rank, standing in the DoD community, and continuing associations—not on the information or access obtained during a periodic OASD(PA) outreach meeting."

Pressroom

Lawrence Di Rita on Shinseki

In a nutshell, Di Rita, who was Donald Rumsfeld's flak in the Pentagon, argues that General Eric Shinseki was not snubbed by Rumseld, that he supported the Iraq war plan, that he was wrong about the number of troops needed in Iraq (his suggestion was dismissed in 2003 as “wildly off the mark”), and that he should correct the record.

"As it happens, and Shinseki would have known this, as many as 400,000 troops were in the pipeline for use during major conflict operations. But nowhere near that number was used. After major conflict operations ended, the number that remained in country settled around 150,000 to 160,000 (about half of Shinseki's guesstimate). Ultimately, commanders brought troop levels down to about 135,000 on the belief that a relatively lighter U.S. footprint would minimize the perception of occupation."

This is why Di Rita's commentary is disingenuous:

• Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz and others dismissed out of hand the assertion that more troops would be needed, and were publicly dismissive of the assertion.  Rumsfeld held to his position even after early evidence suggested that the U.S. did not have enough troops to occupy Iraq. In fact, Rumsfeld cancelled some planned deployments in the early months of occupation.  It is true that Shinseki in effect saluted and kept his mouth shut, but he did so in an environment where dissent was punished.  (Nonetheless, my view is that he should have fallen on his sword; that is the duty of dissenting senior officials.)
  
• Di Rita tries to deflect the well-founded charge that the U.S. did not deploy an adequate occupation force by claiming that 400,000 were in the pipeline and noting that the long-term troop deployment settled at 150,000 or so.  Given the horrific violence and terrible losses suffered by occupation forces as well as Iraqi civilians, it is bizarre to imply that the war planners anticipated correctly the long term challenges that would confront the occupation force.  As for the "pipeline", Rumsfeld was intent to close it.
  
• The risible suggestion that Shinseki did not invite the Secretary of Defense to attend or speak at his retirement ceremony ignores the fact no senior representative of the Secretary was present at the ceremony.  Senior serving officers (old friends of mine) understood that Shinseki was being snubbed, as I surmise Shinseki understood as well.
  
• Finally, Shinseki's retirement (in June 2003) was announced more than a year in advance by the Defense Department (Di Rita was the head of Public Affairs at the time), making the Army Chief of Staff a lame duck even as he testified in February 2003 about troop needs in Iraq.  In other words, Shinseki had already been amply tutored about Rumseld's tolerance for dissent.  (Recall also that the Secretary of the Army Thomas White, who also challenged the Rumsfeld line and supported Shinseki's anticipation of troop requirements, was canned by Rumsfeld in May 2003.)