Ashraf el-Sherif offers an informed assessment of Egypt's Salafists, including their goals and ambitions

Much of the commentary on the role of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt fails to appreciate the debates and developments that have been underway within the Brotherhood and on its margins.

My study of Hizb al-Wasat may provide some timely background on the debates, the role of the government and the ideological and inter-generational debates. The study appears in Remaking Muslim Politics, a volume edited by Robert W. Hefner, which is published by Princeton University Press in 2005.

This 2002 article may also be helpful.

See this recent post as well.

[Added on February 7, 2011:

Daniela Pioppi, on the Islamist Alternative in Egypt; and Carrie Rosefsky Wickham on the Ikhwan.  Pioppi offers a scholarly assessment, which ends on a note of pessimism regarding the Ikhwan's capacity and political health.  As such, her assessment is complementary to the far more extensive as yet unpublished work of Ashraf el-Sherif, who I have referenced here before.  The timely Wickham piece is a concise and informed summary of the political evolution of the Ikhwan from its founding to the present.  Other than getting the date wrong for the emergence of Hizb al-Wasat (it is 2005, not 2006; the party first sought legal status in 2006 but the origins are in late 2005) is a useful precis.  Wickham's closing sentences:

"With a track record of nearly 30 years of responsible behavior (if not rhetoric) and a strong base of support, the Muslim Brotherhood has earned a place at the table in the post-Mubarak era. No democratic transition can succeed without it."]


[Added Feb. 12, 2011: Essam el-Errian on what the Brothers want.]

This January 2007 piece by Hala Mustafa and I deals with Egyptian regime strategy for dealing with liberal opposition groups.

Excerpt:

"Today, Egypt’s non-Islamist opposition finds that nearly any serious effort to organize politically is snuffed out by the regime, and access to the statecontrolled media is typically prevented. Why is this so? Because, as in other Middle Eastern countries, Islamists are unlikely to be regarded by the United States and other major Western powers as a palatable alternative to the existing regimes. So who cares if they are afforded space in the arena of ideas? This allows government officials to wag their fingers at the Americans, mumble “Hamas,” and say, “Is that what you want?” It suits the interests of the rulers that the Americans should hear only one credible voice in opposition, uttering views that are
considered dangerous. The legitimation of thoughtful, committed, liberal reformers who give voice to an attractive, secular, alternative view of politics is to be avoided at all costs."

What role for the Ikhwan?

I draw readers' attention to Hossam Tommam's timely paper (Arabic version) on the Brotherhood, published (coincidentally) on the first day of protests, January 25, 2011,  by the ever-thoughtful Arab Reform Initiative.  Tommam highlights the recent domination of the Brotherhood's conservative wing, reflecting the Mubarak regime's closing of political avenues and the judgment that the political wing had failed in its project to engage with the political system.  

The logic behind the latest Lebanon bombing

Even before the May events, there have been deep worries in Lebanon about the resurgence of Salafi groups especially in the environs of Tripoli. There are four factors that drive the attacks on army connected targets, in my view:
1.Vengeance for the 2007 suppression of Fatah al-Islam in the Nahr al-Barid fighting.
2. Perception that the army is aligned with Hezbollah (army orders have stressed cooperation with the resistance, and the recent policy statement privileged Hezbollah).
3. Judgment that Saad al-Din al-Hariri, with whom Salafi groups had aligned, was shown to be weak. While the Salafis will take his money, they are less inclined to rest their fate in his sometimes shaky hands.
4. Role of external players, which in this case refers to hardline Saudis, who wish to undermine the consensus government in Beirut. That consensus government concedes a major political voice to Hezbollah led opposition.

FT.com / World - Lebanese blast mars electoral law vote

Hezbollah-Salafist MOU frozen

Daily Star - Politics - Salafist groups 'freeze' agreement with hizbullah
The ink hardly dried on the MOU before the Sunni signatory started to back away from it. The document has now been frozen for careful study, and it may not be quickly thawed.

What might have been a significant coup by Hezbollah has become an embarrassment. Shaikh Dai' al-Islam al-Shahhal, said the agreement was one-sided and gave Hezbollah too much.

The MOU was greeted by a very sarcastic editorial--"To Hezbollah--Praise the Lord"--al-Mustaqbal ridiculed Hezbollah, which previously said there was not a problem with the Sunni agreement, for now embracing a document intended to mitigate Sunni-Shi'i animosity. The editorial also reiterated the Future Movement's bill of particulars against Hezbollah, the incurson into West Beirut on May, the closing down of downtown for a year and a half, the close of parliament, etc.

In my earlier post I noted that the MOU seemed to come as a surprise to Saad al-Din al-Hariri. That has now been confirmed. Hariri has distributed a lot of money in the Sunni community, including to Salafi groups, and one has to assume that he has been reeling in his clients. He would want to deny Hezbollah coup de theater that it sought, as well as to thwart a divide and conquer strategy by the Shi'i party.

Other Sunni reaction:
Jama'a al-Islamiyya.

Hezbollah and leading Salafi figure sign a MOU

The Daily Star - Politics - Hizbullah, Salfists ink accord banning sectarian strife
The Memorandum of Understanding signed today by al-Sayyid Amin al-Sayyid, who heads Hezbollah's Politboro, and the "Herald" Hasan al-Shahhal, who leads the main Salifist group in Lebanon is important on several counts:

• It underlines the simmering dangers of a new explosion of Sunni-Shi'i violence, which the MOU is intended to deter.
• It represents something of a success for Hezbollah, since the MOU will somewhat de-legitimize Sunnis who persist in fomenting anti-Shi'i violence.
• It reduces, but does not eliminate the opportunity for Lebanese and outside players to fish in trouble waters.

Nonetheless, there are a variety of Sunni Salafist groups that remain deeply hostile to the Shi'a, and they are unlikely to be decisively deterred by the MOU. Certainly, groups that tend to buy the al-Qaeda line are unlikely to be bowled over by this agreement. Last week's bus bombing in Tripoli lends bloody testament to the real dangers that persist.

It is unclear from the press coverage whether Saad al-Hariri enthusiastically embraced this agreement. Early signs suggest that it may have been presented to him as a done deal.