Familiar Brutality in Tahrir Square

February 2, 2011 will long be fixed in memory, not just for the charge of whip-wielding horsemen and camel riders into the ranks of demonstrators in Cairo’s Tahrir Square, but as the day that the Mubarak regime let loose thugs, policemen in mufti and pro-Mubarak enthusiasts to end the Tahrir demonstrations.  The thugs—"baltagiyya" (singular: "baltagi") are familiar bit players in the regime’s staging of elections and the suppression of demonstrations. [Etymology] The baltagi is paid 50 Egyptian pounds or so for his muscle, and his task is simple: strong-arm and bully people who challenge state authority.  What was exceptional about today was the scale and blatancy of the attacks on the heretofore-peaceful demonstrators, but Egyptians are quite familiar with this sort of behavior.  (Over the past decade Mubarak’s regime has had few Middle Eastern rivals for its coarse brutality, a fact that most U.S. officials chose to ignore.)

I have in my possession (provided by an Egyptian friend in Cairo) a document on the letterhead of the Interior Ministry.  The document is marked “secret” and is a “plan for broadening popular manifestations”, in other words pro-government demonstrators.  The two-page document lists strategies, including hiring baltagiyya, dispensing ammunition, tear gas and so on.

The attacks on the demonstrators at Tahrir would have three primary purposes: to counter the demonstrators’ narrative with voices in support of Mubarak; to break the will of the demonstrators, who have made their stand on one of the most famous public spaces in Egypt; and, to foment chaos, which would demonstrate that only with a strong hand may upheaval or “fitnah”.

One of the surreal moments came when state television, as well as officials at Tahrir, called upon the anti-Mubarak demonstrators to leave because of the “threat of violence” and the fact that “armed intruders” had entered the area, as though the army or other security elements was helpless to raise a hand to defend unarmed civilians.  Indeed, the army did look quite helpless and very complicit on February 2d, when soldiers stood by a watched while scores of Molotov cocktails were tossed by the baltagiyya.

If the game succeeds and the momentum of the anti-Mubarak demonstrators is broken, then Mubarak remains president until September as he vowed in his speech.  This allows time for the government to engineer elections.  It is noteworthy that while Mubarak promised that he did not intend to run in September, he said nothing about his son Gamal, who Mubarak loyalists have been positioning to ascend to the father's throne.

The key player remains the army, which has generally avoided using force against the demonstrators, but has done little to stop the developing clashes.  The army’s hand in Egyptian politics is hard to document because it is difficult and dangerous to research, and the generals prefer to remain in the shadows.  Without the assent of the generals, any attempt to move beyond Mubarak is going to be very risky, and probably impossible.

There are other more pressing risks involving life and death.  Early in the morning hours of February 3, automatic weapons volleys were fired into Tahrir (APHRA, a human rights group, stated the gunfire began at 3:52, to be precise). Reports indicate that at least six people died.   61 Egyptian groups concerned with human rights called for action to save Egyptian young people threatened with violence in Tahrir. 

With the anti-Mubarak collation calling for a massive demonstration on February 4, Friday may be truly a day of decision, perhaps especially for the army.  As the day begins on February 3^rd in Cairo, the more immediate question is whether the Tahrir demonstrators will be able to hold their ground until Friday.


[Robert Springborg, who I know and respect, offers an bleaker analysis and suggests that the back of the protest has already been broken.  I think his assessment is premature, but we will know soon enough.]


[Excellent CNN interview with Emad Shahin (thanks to J).]

Glenn Greenwald has offered valuable commentary in Salon on the Chas Freeman affair, including this item

The distorting effect of anonymity - Glenn Greenwald - Salon.com

AIPAC hid behind the skirts of anonymity while fueling the attacks on Chas Freeman. After reading the Greenwald piece, the dishonesty of the WaPo editorial is hard to deny.

More on the campaign against Chas Freeman and it consequences

Paul Pillar is a highly respected but now intelligence analyst.  He was the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia from 2000 to 2005.  

"The main impact of this affair on intelligence work is not likely to involve the Arab-Israeli dispute, even though it is what concerns those who shot down Freeman. The most important facts and patterns about that tragic conflict are an open book; we don't need the National Intelligence Council to tell us the implications of continued expansion of Israeli settlements, the consequences of rockets fired at Israelis, or the effects of unending occupation on the emotions of those under occupation. The main effects will instead come, perhaps subtly and invisibly, with other issues on which a dominant policy imperative emerges -- such as the Iraq war, though not necessarily with as intense an environment as what the Bush administration created to sell that initiative. The effects will consist of intelligence officers being at least marginally less willing than they otherwise would be to challenge the ethos surrounding the policy and to point out ways in which the policy might be misguided. Some such policies will be misguided, will come a cropper, and will lead to the usual recriminations about how intelligence failed."

"When that happens, those in Congress and elsewhere who acquiesced in the character assassination of Chas Freeman -- or even worse, participated in it -- should ponder two things about intelligence. First, they should ask how they could expect intelligence officers to show superlative courage in bucking political orthodoxy when they showed so little themselves. Second, they should reflect on how their own pusillanimity in the face of the lobby that gunned down Freeman has made it even less likely that intelligence officers will be able to muster such courage in the future."

Also: Freeman on NPR.

What the exit of Chas Freeman exposes

Israel Stance Was Undoing of Nominee for Intelligence Post - NYTimes.com

This is by no means scientific, but it is nonetheless instructive to scan the reader's responses to the Times above-the-fold story on the exit of Chas Freeman. An overwhelming number of the hundreds of comments are critical of the pro-Israel lobby, critical of President Obama for allowing his administration to be bowled over by Israel right-or-wrong zealots and frustrated with the fact that U.S. officials must be subjected to a pro-Israel loyalty test when the appropriate criteria should be loyalty to America. The readers are often critical of politicians, not least Senator Charles Schumer, whose nexus with WH Chief of Staff Rahm Emmanuel is an important part of the story.

Steven J. Rosen, who helped to mobilize the posse of vigilantes that worked to lynch CF before he could assume his chairmanship of the NIC, is identified in the NYT story as a former senior official at AIPAC, which describes itself as "America's pro-Israel lobby". Several readers found it passing strange that Rosen's indictment (under the Espionage Act) for illegally receiving, while he was an AIPAC employee, classified documents and passing them on to Israel went unnoticed in the Times story. I do too.

Also see this predictably hostile editorial in Wapo that describes Freeman's exit statement as a "grotesque libel against Americans who support Israel". In fact, Freeman's criticism was hardly directed toward Americans who support Israel. Here is the relevant section of Freeman's statement:

"There is a special irony in having been accused of improper regard for the opinions of foreign governments and societies by a group so clearly intent on enforcing adherence to the policies of a foreign government – in this case, the government of Israel. I believe that the inability of the American public to discuss, or the government to consider, any option for US policies in the Middle East opposed by the ruling faction in Israeli politics has allowed that faction to adopt and sustain policies that ultimately threaten the existence of the state of Israel. It is not permitted for anyone in the United States to say so. This is not just a tragedy for Israelis and their neighbors in the Middle East; it is doing widening damage to the national security of the United States."

Freeman is clearly focusing on those who arrogate to themselves the duty to protect "Israel's interests" and to insure that Israel's privileged relationship with the U.S. remains intact, even when the bonds of that relationship jeopardize other U.S. national interests. It is obvious that many American friends of Israel are distressed and concerned by some actions of Israel, including the recent assault on Gaza, and they do not necessarily approve of, nor identify with the agenda of the high-profile lobby groups that arrogate to themselves the right to speak for them or for Israel.

The Post argues that Nancy Pelosi was the major foe of CF's appointment, and accepts AIPAC's announcement that it took "no formal position" on the appointment. (Other lobby groups were less reticent to claim responsibility, as illustrated by the ZOA memo of March 11, 2009.) Citing examples of U.S.-Israeli policy disagreements, the editorial elides the constaints that often harness discussion of U.S. policy in areas that are deemed to affect Israel.

Finally, and as David Broder notes also in Wapo, Chas Freeman disappeared "without a squawk" from President Obama. In this episode, and in several others, Barack Obama gives the appearance of former Iranian President Muhammad Khatami. Like Khatami, he was swept into office with extraordinary and wide-ranging support, offering a rhetoric of reform that inspired hope, and yet ultimately may prove a profound disappointment as did the Iranian leader. Khatami's failed because he lacked the will and the political courage to stand up to opponents who sought to undermine his agenda and to continue business as usual. In several recent instances, including the Freeman episode, Obama has shown the same unfortunate trait.