The military has taken power, but in reality the military has--even since the 1952 coup-- held the balance of power in Cairo.
The Egyptian military has always lurked in the shadows of the Egyptian regime. The levers of influence were seldom exposed to view. Yet, when senior civilian politicos, such as Osama al-Baz, reflected on the regime and its prospects for reform, they often pointed to the powerful role of the generals and vetoes they held in their back pockets. For years, as expectations grew that Husni Mubarak's son Gamal would succeed his father, it was the military veto that thwarted him.
Now the power of the generals is in the sunlight. There are some reasons to be optimistic: the army generally showed commendable discipline in its response to the last three weeks of demonstrations, and the demonstrators--whether intuitively or shrewdly--embraced the soldiers; the officer corps is highly professional, promotions are based on merit not connections, and no officer or soldier wishes to be seen as an oppressor of the nation that it is pledged to defend; a skilled group of opposition figures is poised to negotiate a transition, and the Ikhwan have wisely forged consensus with the non-Islamist elements while also remaining in the background; and, the actions and misactions of the military will be in full international view.
Nonetheless, the senior officers have a big stake in the existing system, not least economic interests. In retirement, many senior officers move to industries dominated by the military, and others move into the thriving private sector. But many others infiltrate the civilian branches of government. They will want to protect their prerogatives. The military leadership will prove cautious about dramatic changes, and they will be nervous about permitting a powerful civilian government to challenge their privileges, or hold officers accountable for their misdeeds. The deep suspicion of the Ikhwan will not be erased, so the generals will want to be assured that the Ikhwan (still an illegal entity) will gain no more than a marginal role in politics.
When Presidential elections are held, you can be sure that the military will have satisfied itself that its interests will not be jeopardized. It is too early to determine who all the contenders for the Presidency will be, but it is now clear that Amre Mossa, is a front runner. [Nile TV reported Feb. 11 that he is resigning his post as SG of the Arab League.] He is widely respected, and, indeed, is a man of integrity. He was the popular Foreign Minister of Egypt, so popular that Mubarak that "promoted" him to become Secretary General of the Arab League in order to keep him well distant from Egyptian politics. But a lot may happen in a year of transition, and many secrets will be exposed, so keep your bets in your pocket for now.
[Also posted on Boston U. website.]
The Egyptian military has always lurked in the shadows of the Egyptian regime. The levers of influence were seldom exposed to view. Yet, when senior civilian politicos, such as Osama al-Baz, reflected on the regime and its prospects for reform, they often pointed to the powerful role of the generals and vetoes they held in their back pockets. For years, as expectations grew that Husni Mubarak's son Gamal would succeed his father, it was the military veto that thwarted him.
Now the power of the generals is in the sunlight. There are some reasons to be optimistic: the army generally showed commendable discipline in its response to the last three weeks of demonstrations, and the demonstrators--whether intuitively or shrewdly--embraced the soldiers; the officer corps is highly professional, promotions are based on merit not connections, and no officer or soldier wishes to be seen as an oppressor of the nation that it is pledged to defend; a skilled group of opposition figures is poised to negotiate a transition, and the Ikhwan have wisely forged consensus with the non-Islamist elements while also remaining in the background; and, the actions and misactions of the military will be in full international view.
Nonetheless, the senior officers have a big stake in the existing system, not least economic interests. In retirement, many senior officers move to industries dominated by the military, and others move into the thriving private sector. But many others infiltrate the civilian branches of government. They will want to protect their prerogatives. The military leadership will prove cautious about dramatic changes, and they will be nervous about permitting a powerful civilian government to challenge their privileges, or hold officers accountable for their misdeeds. The deep suspicion of the Ikhwan will not be erased, so the generals will want to be assured that the Ikhwan (still an illegal entity) will gain no more than a marginal role in politics.
When Presidential elections are held, you can be sure that the military will have satisfied itself that its interests will not be jeopardized. It is too early to determine who all the contenders for the Presidency will be, but it is now clear that Amre Mossa, is a front runner. [Nile TV reported Feb. 11 that he is resigning his post as SG of the Arab League.] He is widely respected, and, indeed, is a man of integrity. He was the popular Foreign Minister of Egypt, so popular that Mubarak that "promoted" him to become Secretary General of the Arab League in order to keep him well distant from Egyptian politics. But a lot may happen in a year of transition, and many secrets will be exposed, so keep your bets in your pocket for now.
[Also posted on Boston U. website.]
3 comments:
The military restraint may have been a matter of discipline of the highest echelons, but it could just as well have been the unintended result of a conscript army. If the latter is the case, it would speak highly in favour of conscription: it introduces democracy in the literary sense and puts limits on what megalomaniac hijackers of state power can do.
Thomas Milo
Thanks to Tom Milo for his astute comment. Readers may be interested in knowning that Tom is a gifted Dutch linguist by the way. He is fluent in Arabic, Turkish and a variety of other languages, both familiar and exotic.
the regime will be topped but will the next government be better?
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