Imagine the U.S. were to follow the EU lead

As reported by the Guardian:

"Future agreements between the European Union and Israel must include the explicit exclusion of Jewish settlements in the West Bank or East Jerusalem, according to a new EU directive described by an Israeli official as an "earthquake".

"The EU guidelines, adopted on 30 June, will prohibit the issuing of grants, funding, prizes or scholarships unless a settlement exclusion clause is included. Israeli institutions and bodies situated across the pre-1967 Green Line will be automatically ineligible.

"The Israeli government will be required to state in any future agreements with the EU that settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem are outside the state of Israel.

"The directive, part of the 2014-20 financial framework, covers all areas of co-operation between the EU and Israel, including economics, science, culture, sports and academia. It does not cover trade, such as produce and goods originating in settlements."

The July 3 coup in Egypt: What the law says

Excerpt from the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012:

Coups d'etat

Sec. 7008. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made

available pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the

government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'etat [added emphasis] or decree or, after the date of enactment of this Act, a coup d'etat or decree in which the military plays a decisive role: 

Provided, <> That assistance may be resumed to such government if the President determines and certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that subsequent to the termination of assistance a democratically elected government has taken office: Provided further, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic <> processes: 

Provided further, That

[[Page 125 STAT. 1196]]

funds made available pursuant to the previous provisos shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.

What the White House says:

"I'm being very clear with you ... this is a complex and difficult issue with significant consequences," Carney said during his daily briefing, the first since Egypt's military ousted Morsi nearly a week ago. Calling the action a coup could cut off more than $1.5 billion in annual U.S. foreign aid for Egypt.
But the Obama administration is reluctant to cut off aid. "We think it would not be in the best interests of the United States" to change its aid program at this time, Carney said. Asked if that would mean the administration would be cutting off aid in the near-term, Carney repeated his response: "we think that would not be in our best interests." 

The Egyptian Army is not an instrument of either reform or democracy

The Egyptian Army is not a democratic institution despite its recent pretensions.  One only needs to recall following the ouster of Mubarak for a reminder of how quickly the Army's penchant for autocracy surfaces.  Today's slaughter of scores of apparently innocent civilian protesters underlines the urgency of getting the generals out of the Presidential palace.

Before the situation in Egypt slides further into mayhem, the USG, and not least Obama, needs to grasp that pretending what has happened was not a coup d'état only encourages the generals.  The beginning of an effective policy response is using the word c-o-u-p.  This will oblige the US to suspend military aid and strengthen leverage for moving quickly to a government of national reconciliation.  Now, more than ever, insuring the participation of the MB in such a government is urgent.

The most thuggish institution in Egypt is the police, which has resisted successfully recent attempts at reform.   unless there is an effective establishment of an effective civilian transitional leadership, the police, with the Army's sufferance if not collusion, will return to the business as usual that they know best, namely beating, abusing and arresting anyone who deems to challenge their reign.  

The situation in Egypt threatens to unravel disastrously and compelling US interests demand a firm and unmistakable commitment to inclusive civilian rule in Egypt.  Dawdling only amplifies the long-range risks for the US.

Perceptive OPED by Khaled Abou el-Fadl, "Perils of a People's Coup."

[Also see the concise analysis of Prof. Yoram Meital, a serious student of Egypt, and Sarah Carr's powerful reflection, "On Sheep and Infidels".]

Walter Armbrust, who knows Egypt quite well, offers a thoughtful essay on the strategy of rope-a-dope strategy of the Egyptian generals.

The essay was published in al-Jazeera English.

It is noteworthy that the satellite TV station al-Fara'ayn, which figures importantly in the essay, apparently has been allowed to re-open after being shut on June 30 for criticism of the army commander.  The station has been a platform for Taufiq 'Ukasha, the Mubarak leftover who has been compared to the U.S. conspiracy monger Glenn Beck.  'Ukasha frequently lambasted President Muhammad Mursi for a surfeit of real and imagined failures and motives.

[With the Constitution suspended, the Ministry of Social Affairs has reclaimed it power to ban NGOs and may seek to move against the MB for its use of violence in defending its Cairo Guidance Bureau from being ransacked by demonstrators.

The July 3 Coup

For the opponents of Muhammad Mursi and the Brotherhood this is a moment of euphoria.  But, the moment is unlikely to be followed by significant improvement in economic conditions.  Moreover, there is a high risk of a return to authoritarian rule. While many Egyptians celebrate the coup, it is prudent to be  deeply distrustful of the Egyptian generals and their motives.  They have been the power behind the curtains for decades, and they have consistently acted to protect their sacrosanct budget and privileges.  Their notion of tutelary or guided democracy is a recipe for continued stagnation and repression. 

Mursi was a lousy president; he was not up to the job and he imprudently over-reached.  Yet, much of the bureaucracy, not least the police and the army, willfully thwarted his power and hastened his failure.  When Mursi attempted to engage in dialogue with his opponents in 2012 (pre-empting an Army initiative), the generals let the opposition know that they should not play.

It is very troubling that the generals have not only dumped Mursi, but have now gone after the senior MB leadership, and much of the second tier leadership.  Many will be charged with crimes, apparently.  This may be preliminary to re-criminalizing the MB, which would be reckless. 

A significant percentage of the voting public will support the MB in future elections. This suggests that the only way to preclude their winning future elections may be to return to Mubarak-era policies of preemptive arrests, voter suppression and manufactured electoral results.

Meantime, the anti-Mursi opposition has demonstrated little ability to organize politically versus mobilizing protests.  Indeed, the only group, other than the MB, with a serious nation-wide organization happens to be al-Nour, the Salafist party (which has aligned momentarily with the Army against Mursi).  The social and cultural views of the Salafists make the MB look moderate by comparison.

Of course, the alternative to the coup would have been for millions of Egyptians to continue to suffer under Mursi's inept rule, and to work for a shift in the power balance through parliamentary elections scheduled previously postponed to this autumn.  That is not appealing advice for people who abhor the MB and who are living through very difficult times, but I suggest that it would have been the wiser course if the generals really were intent on preserving the "January 25 Revolution."  

[Please also read the eminently sensible piece by Emile Nakhleh.  He urges a firm policy response by the Obama Adminstration, including a clearly-stated demand that the Egyptian military allow the acting president a free hand to shepherd a process of national reconciliation.]

Reprehensible repression in Saudi Arabia: five to ten year sentences for encouraging protests on Facebook

[Added: HRW offers more detail on the case:

"In the court judgment, which Human Rights Watch obtained, the charges against the seven varied. But the court convicted them all of joining Facebook pages to “incite protests, illegal gathering, and breaking allegiance with the king” and of “assisting and encouraging these calls and corresponding with the [Facebook pages’] followers and concealing them.” All seven were also convicted of violating article 6 of the Anti-Cyber Crime Law, which prohibits producing, sending, or storing any material via an information network that “harms public order.”
"The court imposed its harshest sentence – 10 years in prison – on Abd al-Hamid al-Amer. Prosecutors accused him of founding two Facebook groups, through which he allegedly “conscripted others to join the movements” and “gave them ideas and guidance on the important sites in which to protest and set the timing [of the protests].”
"None of the charges accused the seven of using or advocating violence, as the presiding judge confirmed in the judgment, saying, “Breaking allegiance [with the king] comes by way of arms and it comes by way of protests, marches, and writing articles and publications … the behavior of the [second] course … is sometimes the more dangerous and more malicious method.”"]

Soli Ozel's Campagna-Kerven Lecture at Boston University: "A New Honeymoon: Turkish-American Relations in the Age of Arab Awakening, NATO Weakening, and the Asian Pivot"

Professor Soli Ozel is well known to many readers.  He is a faculty member at Kadir Haz University in Istanbul.  His April 24, 2013, lecture was lively and insightful, occasionally irreverent lecture and certainly of the moment.  The talk is now available at the CKLS website.  (Unfortunately, the streaming video was delayed by a series of technical glitches; a few tweaks remain to be done.)

Institute for Iraqi Studies at Boston University (IISBU) publishes inaugural occasional paper, The Hawza Under Siege: A Study in the Ba'th Party Archive, by Abbas Kadhim

Making use of Ba'thist intelligence archives Kadhim examines the efforts of Saddam Hussein and his subordinates to influence, control, intimidate and subvert Shi'i religious authorities, especially the leading clerical authorities in al-Najaf. His study is detailed and nuanced, and it may be downloaded for free from the IIS website.

A Kindle version is available as well, and Ibook and Epub versions are in progress.

Video from the April 2013 Boston University meeting

Intro by Prof. A R Norton

State-Society Questions:

Professor Gareth Stansfield (University of Exeter) Moderator article
10:15 a.m. H.E. Abdul Latif Rashid, “The Kurds of Iraq”

Video from the April 2013 Boston University meeting

Video 2 of 3

Featuring Prof Ali Banuazizi, Prof Matteo Legrenzi and Amb Charles Dunbar

Video from the April 2013 Boston University meeting

April 2013 conference Iraq+10
Video 3 of 3

State-Society Questions II:

Professor Eric Davis (Rutgers University), Moderator
Dr. Hanan al-Fatlawi (M.P.), “The Dynamics of Parliamentary Life in a Free Iraq”

Why are Turks so angry?

"It is the grandiosity of power and the increasingly punitive state that has pushed people onto the streets and keeps them hanging from the windows of their homes every day, banging pots into the night. Even the revered father of the traditional family is expected to care about all this. But Prime Minister Erdogan, after insulting the protesters and refusing to acknowledge that there was any problem whatsoever, instead left for Morocco to attend a trade meeting."

Jenny White's further insights may be found on her highly readable blog, Kamil Pasha.

Kenneth Love, R.I.P.

Kenneth Love, the former New York Times correspondent in Cairo and Tehran, died May 13, 2013.  He was 88.  His Suez: The Twice Fought War is a gem.  The book remains a riveting and invaluable account of the 1956 Suez war and the June war of 1967.  He had impressive contacts in Egypt, and he was a master of wonderfully researched reportage.  I admired his talent.

Obama’s Moment to Make the Case for Middle East Peace

Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace*

If it were easy to do, an American president would have long ago shepherded Israelis and Palestinians into the negotiated two-state peace agreement that both peoples and their neighbors so clearly need — a peace that would greatly enhance U.S. interests.

There are many reasons why it will be hard for President Obama to achieve, in his second term, the Israeli-Palestinian peace accord that has eluded him and his predecessors for so long. The rise of radical one-state nationalists and ideologically driven settlers in Israeli politics, the debilitating split in the Palestinian camp between Hamas and Fatah, the power struggles and sectarian enmities roiling the region — these are all factors adding to the difficulty of forging the two-state peace agreement that alone can end the agony of occupation for Palestinians and bring Israel a sounder more durable form of security.