Institute for Iraqi Studies at Boston University (IISBU) publishes inaugural occasional paper, The Hawza Under Siege: A Study in the Ba'th Party Archive, by Abbas Kadhim

Making use of Ba'thist intelligence archives Kadhim examines the efforts of Saddam Hussein and his subordinates to influence, control, intimidate and subvert Shi'i religious authorities, especially the leading clerical authorities in al-Najaf. His study is detailed and nuanced, and it may be downloaded for free from the IIS website.

A Kindle version is available as well, and Ibook and Epub versions are in progress.

A few comments after a long hiatus, beginning with Iran

Sorry for the long absence, but there were a variety of diversions. I will resume with several posts this week.

Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann created a bit of discussion a few weeks ago with their NYT OPED, which questioned the level of support enjoyed by the opposition in Iran.

I will not replay the criticisms of other people here, but there is one point that has not been made and that needs to be made. One stated assumption of their provocative piece was that the demonstrators were diffuse in their objectives. This was contrasted with the 1978-79 revolution, in which the authors presume that the opposition to were unified in purpose. In the authors' words: "They wanted to oust the American-backed regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and to replace it with an Islamic republic."

In fact, this is a mistaken reading of the Iranian revolution. As participants in the revolution will readily attest, there was a negative consensus, namely toppling the Shah, but there was by no means any consensus on what should come next. Many demonstrators simply presumed that whatever came after the Shah would be better, others expected a democracy of one sort or another, still others expected a socialist republic, and, of course, those who ultimately triumphed yearned for an Islamic state. Even after Khomeini's triumphant return in early 1979, the shape of the state to be was much in question, and it was not until later in the year that Khomeini's unique role as jurisconsult and that the idea of an Islamic Republic was embraced.

Therefore, the earlier revolution is, contra Leverett and Mann, quite instructive. Today's demonstrators seem to united in their contempt for the regime, but of many minds in terms of what comes next.

I would also not underestimate the courage that it requires for people, young and old alike, to move into the streets and challenge the government. Therefore, although the government may be able to mobilize large demonstrations, for which the participants may be rewarded and will face no threat of imprisonment, we should not devalue the importance of demonstrations that question the very legitimacy of the Islamic Republic.

There is a difference between the 1978-79 revolution and that is that the security apparatus splintered. We have not seen that happening…yet, and it may not happen. I have no doubt that there are sharp debates with the security forces about how far to go in attempting to squash the demonstrations. It will take more than a few policemen joining arms with Green protesters to signal a major fissure. Even so, you can be sure that the decision, for instance, to castigate Saeed Mortazavi for mistreating prisoners was not made lightly. From a variety of credible sources it seems that President Ahmadinejad favors a severe crackdown and opposed "outing" Mortazavi. So, while it is somewhat useful to try to count demonstrators, it is far more interesting to try to glimpse the contours of the debate within the powerful security apparatus.

Video link: Mustafa Akyol's Boston U. lecture, April 15, 2009.

BUniverse - Yes, We Can! Toward a Brave New Turkey

"Turkish journalist Mustafa Akyol discusses Turkey’s historical and contemporary struggle toward political and cultural modernity in the 2009 Campagna-Kerven Lecture on Modern Turkey. Since 1996, the lecture series has brought leading scholarly and popular authorities to Boston University to speak on Turkey’s changing society and its role in the Middle East. Although the country has long sought to embrace Western values, Akyol argues, recent developments are causing many Turks to reconsider what “westernization” actually means.

"Akyol begins with an overview of the region’s history, from the Ottoman Empire to the creation of the Republic of Turkey in the 1920s to the present. He argues that many observers wrongly overlook the religiously and ethnically diverse — and surprisingly tolerant — Ottoman society when seeking an explanation for Turkish Muslim’s relatively progressive attitudes: “The sum of the dichotomies between Islam and democracy was actually sorted out by Islamic intellectuals back in the nineteenth century,” Akyol asserts. He explains the rise of the Republic in the context of Turkey’s tendency to equate modernization with westernization. Throughout the last century, he notes, liberals have tried to force social reforms on the Turkish people, while “democracy” has been equated with allowing people to live more traditional lifestyles (such as a Muslim woman choosing to wear a headscarf). Now, he says, the Turkish middle class is beginning to regard religious freedom as more of a Western idea than as enforced modern customs.

"After examining both historical and current episodes in Turkish life, Akyol concludes that, despite a growing Islamist sentiment within the country, religious struggles ultimately will not destabilize the nation. It is rising Turkish nationalism, he says, and not traditional Islam, that “has turned into a force which opposes anything that is new.” But, he says, the people who have corrupted Ataturk’s legacy — such as two retired generals who are now on trial for attempting a coup — are showing Turkish citizens that “the people who claim to be patriots can also be criminals.”"

BU Universe videos.