R.I.P. Professor Rouhoullah "Ruhi" K. Ramazani

Ruhi Ramazani, the doyen of Iran scholars in North American, was a distinguished University of Virginia scholar, an elegant and optimistic human being, and a man whose generous heart was legion among those who knew him.  He and his beloved wife Nesta were wonderful hosts and keen interlocutors who often opened their home to students, young and upcoming scholars and fellow colleagues.  Ruhi's passing is a time of sadness but also an occasion to remember and celebrate his seminal work.

Nuggets from an intriguing piece on the United Against Nuclear Iran NGO, which is being shielded by the U.S. Department of Justice

"The Obama administration has gone to court to protect the files of an influential anti-Iran advocacy group, saying they likely contain information the government does not want disclosed."

..........

"Lawyers for Victor Restis, who filed the defamation suit, have accused the group of being funded by unidentified foreign interests and are trying to force the testimony of Israeli’s former intelligence chief and a prominent Israeli businessman."

..........

"If the group has information belonging to the American government, it is not clear how it obtained it. American intelligence agencies are prohibited from secretly working with organizations to influence American public opinion and media. If the information does not belong to the government, it is not clear what makes it so sensitive."

........

"Founded in 2008, United Against Nuclear Iran is run and advised by a long list of former government officials. Its advisers include Joseph I. Lieberman, the former Democratic senator from Connecticut; Frances Townsend, the former homeland security adviser to President George W. Bush; Dennis B. Ross, a former Middle East adviser to both Republican and Democratic presidents; and former intelligence chiefs from Israel, Germany and Britain."

..........

"Mr. Restis said he was approached by an Israeli businessman, Rami Ungar, with no direct connection to United Against Nuclear Iran.

"According to court documents filed by Mr. Restis’s lawyers, Mr. Ungar knew details about the case and said he was “authorized to try to resolve the issues” on behalf of the group’s supporters.

"It was not clear who those supporters were. Like many nonprofit groups, its donor list is secret. Mr. Restis’s lawyers said in a letter to the judge in April that they had uncovered information that United Against Nuclear Iran “is being funded by foreign interests.”"

"....He is also seeking testimony from Meir Dagan, the former Israeli intelligence chief and an adviser to United Against Nuclear Iran, who Mr. Restis believes served as a conduit between the source and the group.

..........

"If the Justice Department formally asserts the law-enforcement privilege this week, Judge Ramos has said he will have “a great number of questions” about how and why.

"“I am particularly concerned,” he said in April, “that the defendants are able to utilize certain information in its public statements, and then not have to answer to their actions on the basis of a privilege.”"

Iran’s Domestic Politics & the Nuclear Standoff

Lecture

“Iran’s Domestic Politics & the Nuclear Standoff with the United States: Internal dynamic of Iran’s Nuclear Intentions”

Speaker: Bahman Baktiari

Wednesday, April 18, 2012
12:00 to 1:30 pm
Eilts Conference Room, 154 Bay State Road, Room 203, Boston, MA

Bahman Baktiari is the Executive Director of the International Foundation for Civil Society in Salt Lake City, UT. He received his PhD in Government from Woodrow Wilson Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at University of Virginia. He has published extensively on Iranian politics and society. His major publication Parliamentary Politics in Revolutionary Iran was published by University Press of Florida in 1997.

His most recent publications include “Sharia Politics and the Transformation of Islamic Law in Iran ” was published in Shari‘a Politics: Islamic Law and Society in the Modern World , edited by Robert W. Hefner, Indiana University Press ( 2011), Seeking International Legitimacy: Understanding the Dynamics of Nuclear Nationalism in Iran, in Nuclear Politics in Iran, edited by Judith S. Yaphe, published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University (2010), Iran’s Conservative Moment, Current History ( January 2007), Voices within Islam: Four Perspectives on Tolerance and Diversity, Current History (January 2005), Doubting Reforms in Iran ( coauthored with Haleh Vaziri ) Current History ( January 2003), Impact of September 11th on Iranian Foreign Policy, Middle East Policy ( December 2002), Exporting the Islamic Revolution: Iranian-Egyptian Relations, With Asef Bayat in N. Keddie and R. Mathee edited, Iran and the Surrounding World: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics, University of Washington Press ( 2002). He also published several opinion pieces the Christian Science Monitor on Iranian political developments and its impact on foreign policy and relations with the United States.He has been interviewed on several national media outlets, including the NPR Morning Edition, Talk of the Nations, The Todd Feinburg Radio, and Jim Lehrer NewsHour.

Free and open to the public. Includes lunch.

Sensible appraisal of Obama's Iran policy by Nicholas Burns

"The most confounding aspect of our public debate is that we are considering war with a dangerous adversary about whom we know very little. No senior American official has even met Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei. There has been virtually no contact between the two governments in 30 years. As undersecretary of state working on Iran policy during President Bush’s second term, I and my colleagues were not permitted to talk to Iranian officials. It went against an elementary lesson I learned as a diplomat - no matter how distasteful, we must talk to governments we don’t like if we want to outsmart them and avoid war. For that very reason, an earlier and much wiser Israeli leader, Yitzhak Rabin, warned memorably, “You don’t make peace with friends. You make it with very unsavory enemies.’’

......... 

"Obama’s critics would do well to recall two hard facts. First, diplomacy takes time. If Iran doesn’t capitulate within a few weeks, predictable voices will call for war instead. We have time to negotiate before Iran gets perilously close to a nuclear weapons capability. Obama should take that time to figure out if Iran is serious. That is how diplomacy works on an issue as complicated and potentially deadly as this."

Advance Copy--NYT Magazine--"Will Israel Attack Iran?"

Also see:
Pollack: Sliding toward war?
Philip Weiss: Times give platform Iran war advocacy.

U.S.-Pakistan relations and the drone affair

William deB. Mills offers several noteworthy observations on the U.S.-Pakistan-Iran triangle in light of Iran's downing of the U.S. drone.  He reflects on the declining U.S.-Pakistan reaction, the Pakistani reaction to Iran coup de theatre and the prospects for an Iran-Pakistan alliance based on shared antipathy to U.S. goals, complementary economic interests, and worldviews.

Lenore Martin's reflection on Turkish-Syrian-Iranian relations is a reminder that among the reverberations of the upheaval in Syria may be a realignment on the Kurdish question

While often unnoticed, even in usually informed commentary, there have been periodic indicators of Iranian-Turkish cooperation vis-a-vis Kurdish nationalist insurgents.  As Lenore Martin notes, both Syria and Iran might seek to stoke the Kurdish insurgency against Turkey as a riposte to Ankara's recent hostility to the al-Asad regime.

IGRC Commander Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari leaves little doubt about the Pasdaran's view toward reformist voices, including former President Khatami

In the interview, Jafari -- appointed to his post by the country's supreme leader, Ali Khamenei -- took it upon himself to outline the conditions he would set for the return to politics of reformists -- including former President Mohammad Khatami, who was elected to office twice with more than 70% of the popular vote.
"Members of the reformist camp who have not crossed the red lines can naturally participate in political campaigns," he said. "However, Mr. Khatami's success in his activities depends on his stances. Mr. Khatami did not pass his test successfully during the sedition incident and he showed a lot of support for the sedition leaders."

Persian link.

Remember the fatuous charges by King Hamad that Iran was behind the protests in Bahrain?

Here is the extent of the accusation, according to the former ambassador the Court of Saint James, Shaikh Abdulaziz al-Khalifa:

Al-Khalifa also maintained that Iran was fomenting the protests despite Defense Secretary Robert Gates saying the U.S. had seen no evidence of that. "The one thing that we can assure you that speeches by Hezbollah and elements of the government in Iran and their TV channels and their religious clerics haven't helped the situation, they've inflamed the situation," Al-Khalifa said. "They've outreached to the more hard-line element of the protesters."

As I have said here before, "poppycock!",

Well-argued OPED on Bahrain

Emile Nakhleh, whose 1975 book is a seminal account of Bahraini politics, offers a smart commentary on Bahrain.

"In truth, Bahrain is just one further country in which the spectre of Shia threat has been carefully constructed to maintain US support for a repressive regime. When I was in the intelligence community, we briefed about sources of instability, often citing the systematic discrimination against the Shia. These grievances, now voiced by protesters, have seen the majority excluded from power and denied basic freedoms for decades."
..........................
"Whatever happens, the west must be sceptical of talk about a rising Shia crescent. Iran’s influence has increased since the invasion of Iraq. But few Shia groups in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon have turned to it for guidance. Instead, they focus on domestic grievances. If there is a Shia revival, it is country specific. Iran’s influence in these places is no larger than it ever was."

What are Israeli strategists thinking? One example.

The setting for these remarks was the Herzliya National Security Conference, in early February.  They are reported in Defense News, Feb. 14, 2011, pp. 1 and 8.

Retired U.S. Marine Gen. James Jones, who up until last October served as Obama’s national securi­ty adviser, dismissed claims of Washington’s decline.

“I reject the idea that the United States is in decline or even in rela­tive decline,” Jones told conference participants here. “To be sure, there is much to be done to ensure we are as successful in the 21st century as we were in the 20th ... and Egypt is just a small sign of the potential for change.” Alongside efforts to prevent a nu­clear-armed Iran and to fortify a coalition of the moderates com­prised of pro-Western Arab states respectful of the universal rights of its people, Jones cited the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as “a mat­ter of urgent necessity.” Jones said the lack of a peace deal jeopardizes regional stability by un­dermining moderates, provoking the young and hopeless classes, and empowering Iran.

Time is not on Israel’s side, Jones warned: “The growing isolation of Israel is a very real concern. The number of countries that recognize a Palestinian state can outrank the number of countries that recognize Israel.” Jones urged Israel’s leaders to restart peace negotiations.

“Failure to act could ignite a rep­etition of Egypt on streets in neigh­boring countries,” he said. “Will ex­tremists win the hearts and minds of the young Arab street? Or will moderate voices prevail for a two­state solution? This could be the most important national security question of our time, and if we fail, history will not forgive us.” Amos Gilead, director for politi­cal-military affairs at Israel’s Min­istry of Defense, was brutally direct in rejecting Jones’ premise.

“Even if we sign an agreement to­morrow with the [Palestinian Au­thority], they won’t honor it,” Gilead said. “Look around the Middle East: If there is a democratic process here, it will bring, for sure, hell.” In tactless and borderline racist remarks here, Gilead insisted that democracy and stability cannot co­exist in the Arab Middle East.

“In the Middle East and the Arab world, there is no place for democ­racy,” he said.

Gilead said free elections in the region would breed either a Gaza­like “Hamastan,” or Lebanon, which he described as a so-called democracy.

“In Lebanon, there is a constitu­tion without a state. They have an elected president, prime minister, speaker, but the country is losing it­self when it allows entities more powerful than Lebanon to drive the agenda,” Gilead said, alluding to Hezbollah.

“The only place in the region with a real chance of democracy is Iran,” a non-Arab nation, he said. “But what was the reaction to Iranian democratic forces? Indifference. And so dissenters in Iran got the message and we lost the opportuni­ty to change Iran.”

Too many to arrest

Anger and resentment has been seething not for months or years but for several decades across the Middle East.  The particulars from one case to another differ obviously, but the complaints of corruption, petty and profound arrogance, and deafness to the demands for economic opportunity, a place to live, and respect for the dignity of the person are common.  For younger people, the complaints often come down to the fact that a person cannot afford to marry, or live a decent, even marginally fulfilling life.  I have heard these complaints firsthand and often in Egypt, Iran, Bahrain, Jordan, Syria and in the occupied West Bank and Gaza.

To stifle and choke the complaints pantheons of national security agencies and political agents have been at work.  However, when the moment comes, as it now has, when not just 100 or 200 but 10,000 or 100,000 people persist in demonstrating, the economy of scale overwhelms the resources of repression.  There are just too many people to arrest, or to beat or to gas.

In some places, not least Bahrain, the complaints coincide with sectarian differences and disparities in privilege that are extraordinary because they are so readily noticed.  In short, the demonstrations in Bahrain were eminently predictable.  Travel from cosmopolitan capital Manama to the predominantly and very distressed Shi'i city of Sitrah, and the differences are abrupt and stunning. Sitrah, along with many of the Shi'i villages in Bahrain, is a dreadful place to live.  Or stay in your chair and look at unemployment or per capita income data for Bahrain.  The data speaks volumes about the inequity that defines Bahraini society.  President Obama has praised King Hamad for his reforms, and former President Bush extolled the King as a democrat, with the result that both presidents provoked justified ridicule for their blindness. 

In my experience, people in the Middle East have sought models of change for years.  In years passed they watched Algeria with fascination, until the army provoked a civil war; Yemen, until a civil war erupted in 1994; Lebanon, where Hezbollah provided a military model of resistance; and, Turkey, where religiously oriented politicians came to power constitutionally.  However, the Tunisian and Egyptian models are unqiue: they are not examples of top-down reform, or of elite deals, but of people grabbing their own destiny and facing down oppression.  In that sense, what has happened is powerful and, I suspect, long-lasting.  

Regimes, as in Algeria, Syria and Iran, habitually adopt a tough iron fist policy, but the iron fist depends on the people being intimidated and cowed. It is precisely the importance of the Tunisian and Egyptian exemplars that there were observable tipping points, ones beyond which savagery becomes counter-productive and self-destructive in face of large numbers of people who are neither cowed nor any longer intimidated.

It is not difficult to imagine scenarios in which political authority fragments in Yemen under the weight of demonstrations, and it is not a stretch to imagine serious demonstrations in Iraq continuing and growing in scale, just to take two of many examples.

In the coming months, it will be fascinating to watch the ruling elites change their game to pre-empt demands. Their steps will divert money from budgets to underwrite new subsidies for food and fuel, anti-corruption will become the flavor of the year, and efforts will be made to demonstrate that the people on top are listening to the masses.  A lot of this is going to look staged and theatrical and soon become the bunt of jokes and derision, the feedstock for Facebook, instant messaging and other social networks.  The real tests will be whether the kings, emirs and presidents are truly ready to release their grips, to increase accountability and to open up political space.  

In other words, will they embrace structural changes that potentially diminish their power while simultaneously attempting to meet long frustrated and ignored economic demands?  

I expect a rocky ride.

Iran's Nuclear Program, as seen in mid January

This is part of an interview that I gave more than two weeks ago. Since the interview, Iran has rejected key components of the enriched fuel storage plan devised by the IAEA.

The point that I made emphatically was that the U.S. would occupy a more credible position if it emphasized a strong commitment to a nuclear free Middle East in its diplomacy. President Obama did raise the issue in his Cairo speech, and on a few other occasions, but these references have the quality of boiler-plate. In much of the commentary on the Iranian nuclear program, there is no mention whatsoever of Israel's substantial nuclear arsenal. Israel, of course, does not adhere to the NPT and declares pro forma that it will not be the first state to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, whereas, if the estimates of the CIA (not to mention the Vanunu revelations in October 1986) are to be trusted, it already has. To presume that Israel's arsenal is not one of the factors that drive the Iranian program is willful ignorance. It would be naive to presume that Israel would easily agree to surrender its nuclear warheads. Nonetheless, silence about Israel's cache of weapons gives it more freedom of movement on the issue than U.S. interests dictate.

Were it possible to thwart Iran's drive for nuclear weapons without creating a host of other problems, that would obviously be beneficial to the U.S. and the states of the Middle East. My concern, as expressed in the interview, is that that is not very likely to be possible.

A few comments after a long hiatus, beginning with Iran

Sorry for the long absence, but there were a variety of diversions. I will resume with several posts this week.

Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann created a bit of discussion a few weeks ago with their NYT OPED, which questioned the level of support enjoyed by the opposition in Iran.

I will not replay the criticisms of other people here, but there is one point that has not been made and that needs to be made. One stated assumption of their provocative piece was that the demonstrators were diffuse in their objectives. This was contrasted with the 1978-79 revolution, in which the authors presume that the opposition to were unified in purpose. In the authors' words: "They wanted to oust the American-backed regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi and to replace it with an Islamic republic."

In fact, this is a mistaken reading of the Iranian revolution. As participants in the revolution will readily attest, there was a negative consensus, namely toppling the Shah, but there was by no means any consensus on what should come next. Many demonstrators simply presumed that whatever came after the Shah would be better, others expected a democracy of one sort or another, still others expected a socialist republic, and, of course, those who ultimately triumphed yearned for an Islamic state. Even after Khomeini's triumphant return in early 1979, the shape of the state to be was much in question, and it was not until later in the year that Khomeini's unique role as jurisconsult and that the idea of an Islamic Republic was embraced.

Therefore, the earlier revolution is, contra Leverett and Mann, quite instructive. Today's demonstrators seem to united in their contempt for the regime, but of many minds in terms of what comes next.

I would also not underestimate the courage that it requires for people, young and old alike, to move into the streets and challenge the government. Therefore, although the government may be able to mobilize large demonstrations, for which the participants may be rewarded and will face no threat of imprisonment, we should not devalue the importance of demonstrations that question the very legitimacy of the Islamic Republic.

There is a difference between the 1978-79 revolution and that is that the security apparatus splintered. We have not seen that happening…yet, and it may not happen. I have no doubt that there are sharp debates with the security forces about how far to go in attempting to squash the demonstrations. It will take more than a few policemen joining arms with Green protesters to signal a major fissure. Even so, you can be sure that the decision, for instance, to castigate Saeed Mortazavi for mistreating prisoners was not made lightly. From a variety of credible sources it seems that President Ahmadinejad favors a severe crackdown and opposed "outing" Mortazavi. So, while it is somewhat useful to try to count demonstrators, it is far more interesting to try to glimpse the contours of the debate within the powerful security apparatus.

Five myths about Iran and nuclear weapons

1. Iran is on the verge of developing a nuclear weapon.
2. A military strike would knock out Iran's program.
3. We can cripple Iran with sanctions.
4. A new government in Iran would abandon the nuclear program.
5. Iran is the main nuclear threat in the Middle East.

Quoted from conclusion==A comprehensive plan must build barriers against acquiring nuclear weapons and must reduce the motivation to do so. This means dealing with the regional security and prestige issues that motivate most countries to start nuclear programs. It requires a global approach that deals with both sides of the nuclear coin: disarmament and proliferation. Reducing existing nuclear stockpiles creates the support needed to stop the spread of the weapons; stopping the spread creates the security needed to continue reductions. We must keep flipping that coin over. Each flip, each step, makes us a little safer.

The author is Joseph Cirincione, President of the Ploughshares Fund. He is respected authority on nuclear profileration.

Quds Day: Keshavarz Blvd., Tehran, 18 September 2009

One of America's exceptional diplomats reflects on his four decades in the Middle East, including his role in Iraq and Afghanistan

Ryan Crocker is one of those diplomats who hated serving in Washington and yearned to be in the field. He served as U.S. Ambassador in four key countries--Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq--and he opened the U.S. Embassy in Kabul in 2001. He has notable comments on the U.S. dialogue with Iran, which ended in the spring of 2003, after a period of important cooperation in Afghanistan, as well as about his service in Iraq.

I first met him almost 30 years when he was Political Officer in Beirut (before his office was blown up when the embassy was destroyed in April 1983). I was immediately impressed by his open mind, his curiosity and his feel for what was going on in Lebanon at the time. I strongly urge that you spend some time reading his reflections.

"God is greater" protests continue in Tehran (video)

"Allahuakbar" protests continue in Tehran.  

Laura Secor on Iran's show trials

The spectacle of Iran's inept trials may well be the image that survives this summer. We watched a ruling apparatus committed first and foremost to its survival and so blinded by its ideological posturing that it is probably incapable of understanding how contemptible it appeared not just to western audiences but to Third world opinion.

There will be much to discuss after the August doldrums, including the hardening of the U.S. policy orientation to Iran. The U.S. will squeeze harder on Iran for a variety of reasons, including: the Iran's unimpeded nuclear program, Iran's spurning of the U.S. offer to dance, and the need to compensate Israel for something that looks like a freeze in the continuing expansion and construction of illegal settlements. No doubt, there will be an attempt for a tougher UNSC resolution, as well as an effort to exploit Iran's dependence on imported gasoline.

Patterns of detainee abuse in Iran

Torture admitted by General Ismail Ahmadi Moghaddam, but attributes prisoners' deaths to a "viral illness."