More on the legacy of Dennis Ross, Peace Processor

Does the Arab League now have attention of Bashar al-Asad? Equally important, will the elites of Damascus and Aleppo rethink their tacit support for the regime?

"The people want international protection, an air embargo and relief from the murderer."

Ryan C. Crocker will be the next U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

No living U.S. diplomat can rival Ryan Crocker's record for service in difficult posts, often at the most trying an dangerous times.  His posts have included Afghanistan (one prior assignment), Iran, Iraq (three times, once as the ambassador), Kuwait (as ambassador), Lebanon (twice, once as ambassador), Pakistan (as ambassador), and Syria (as ambassador).

Last autumn he delivered the inaugural lecture for the Boston University Institute for Iraqi Studies.  Here is the link to the video.

If not now, when?

Download the PDF format book here.  Available from Amazon.

Available on Kindle.

Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace, Feb. 8, 2011 (part 4)

See here for all videos.

Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace, Feb. 8, 2011 (part 1)

Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S.: Husni who?

Christine Amanpour  (January 30, 2011) to  Sameh Shoukry, the Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S.:  "Do you expect President Mubarak to survive in power?"  He answers that the people of Egypt have shown solidarity and that every loyal Egyptian will contribute to the nation, and he never mentions Mubarak.  


In other words, dear readers, Mubarak is history.


Update:
"Would you like President to stay in power?"
Later, on Jan. 30, Ambassador Shoukry appears on CNN (12:15 EST).   He notes that it is up to the people, civil society, national dialogue to determine the future of Egypt.  When asked about Mubarak, he avoids any affirmation of President Mubarak, and refers to the Egyptians peoples' aspirations.  He refers to the importance of Egypt's institutions, never letting the president's name pass his lips.
He denies that Muhammad Baradei was under house arrest, incidentially.

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu meets President Obama on July 6, 2010

Netanyahu was to meet Obama a month ago, but he curtailed his North American visit to return to Israel to deal with the crisis created by Israel commandeering the Gaza aid flotilla on May 31.

Expect little of substance from the meeting on the peace-seeking front, notwithstanding claims by Bibi-enablers that the Israeli leader "wants to be a peacemaker".  Netanyahu will try to gain credit for adjustments to the punitive blockade of Gaza, adjustments necessitated by the resounding condemnation that Israel confronts for its collective punishment of Gaza.  Key elements of the blockade continue, including prohibiting Gazan exports.

George Mitchell's laconic efforts to move Israel-PA proximity negotiations along have borne little fruit.  This is no surprise.  Netanyahu has no interest in a viable two-solution. He never has had such an interest.  Recall that in his earlier tenure as Prime Minister, he played much the same game with Bill Clinton that is playing with Obama today: prevaricate then negotiate over petty concessions while demanding recompense and approval from the U.S.

As I have noted here, he may be opportunistic and crass, but Netanyahu operates within an ideological vector that has no room for an independent Palestinian state, particularly one premised on the end of Israel's colonization of the West Bank.

As the expression goes: the fruit does not fall very far from the tree.  Here is a discussion with Netanyahu's father.  Benzion Netanyahu, now 100 years old, was secretary to Ze'ev Jabotinsky, founder of Revisionist Zionism.  As you read his words, ponder the discussions around the Netanyahu kitchen table of Bibi's youth.

And here is the Prime Minister as a young man, in 1977.  He was then known as Ben Nitay.  He is questioned by a young Fouad Ajami.

Link. 

Netanyahu's National Security Adviser is a former Mossad man named Uzi Arad, who was previously barred from entering the US as a security risk.  Azad is a hardliner whose views are in synch with Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman and Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon.  Azad's bottom line on negotiations with the Palestinians?  Concessions by Israel encourage Palestinian rejectionists.  For Azad, Israel's strategic priority is confronting Iran.  Meantime, you kick the two-state can down the road, placating the Americans without making serious concessions or ceasing the dispossession of Palestinians from their land.  Do you think that Netanyahu chose a National Security Adviser who contradicts his own views?

What to expect from the July 6 meeting?  Very little that will lend even a modicum of vitality to Mitchell's mission and lots of talk about the need to confront Iran.

Will Obama stand his ground?

Putting a smiley face on US-Israel relations, Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren notes that Israel's policy on Jerusalem remains unchanged but that relations between the two states are "great". Oren is an historian who specialized in PR work for the IDF when he periodically reported for voluntary reserve duty--as during the 2008-9 Gaza campaign. In March, he was quoted to remark that US-Israeli relations were at their lowest point in 35 years. (The comment came in a conference call with Israeli diplomats.) He subsequently denied making the crisis comment, but not very convincingly, as a variety of accounts underline.

So, if Oren's latest assessment is to be believed, there has been a real turnabout in recent weeks. This would be a significant demonstration of power by the pro-Israeli lobby forces. Since the Biden slap there has been a concerted effort by leading lobby groups, not least AIPAC, to tamp down the crisis and get Congress in step, which is a well-practiced drill. Read here to see if your favorite representative jumped aboard the Israel right-or-wrong train.

Despite the smiles, including from the Obama White House, the underlying contradictions in US-Israeli perspectives on peacemaking remain however. The debate within the administration continues. It is well understood that the US pays a heavy price for Israeli intransigence, especially in the context US relations with the Muslim world. Obama has found a lot of support for stance on settlement from the foreign policy establishment, including former Secretary of State James Baker, who upended Yitzhak Shamir precisely over the issue of illegal settlements nearly two decades ago. Baker earlier faulted Obama for backing down on his demand that Israel freeze settlement construction:

I don’t fault President Obama for making settlements an issue, but I do fault him for caving in. You can’t take a position that is consistent with U.S. policy going back many years, and the minute you get push-back you soften your position. When you are dealing with foreign leaders, they can smell that kind of weakness a thousand miles away. Both Democratic and Republican administrations have long endorsed the U.S. policy that settlements are an obstacle to peace. If “land for peace” is the path to a resolution, then settlements clearly create facts on the ground that foreclose the possibility of negotiations.

There is reason to believe that the President understands that he made a serious error by backing off his previous demand for settlement freeze. He now seems to have revived his determination to move toward a solution of the conflict. If so, expect that a lot of the debate will go by out of public sight, but as early as the fall we might see the framework for a settlement from the White House.

The Boston Study Group's report is a good guide to what a solution is likely to comprise.

Ehud Olmert, Ehud Barak or Yitzhak Rabin could have authored much of Stephen Walt's piece

In a nutshell, Walt is arguing that without an attainable two-state solution Israel's survival in its present form is in jeopardy. This is precisely the point that the late Yitzhak Rabin acknowledged, and the argument that the two Ehud's have both made explicitly. It is in Israel's enlightened interest to pursue a two-solution that the Palestinian Arabs living under occupation will accept. This is the major claim of the Walt Oped.

Nonetheless, the ghost of Ze'ev Jabotinksky still haunts Israel, and his Revisionist Zionist vision of a territorially extensive Israel, in which Arabs must accept Jewish rule still inspires the right in Israel, including the current Prime Minister. This leaves an unaddressed question, namely whether or not Netanyahu will ever accept an attainable peace (in contrast to his sardonic description of a two-state solution). See Efraim Inbar's recent essay to sample the vision that inspires Netanyahu's constituency.

Appropriately, Walt also invokes U.S. interests, which require a two-state solution, as noted on March 16, 2010, by General David Petraeus in his Senate testimony. The U.S. and Israel have many overlapping interests, but this does not mean that their interests always coincide. (See the predictable dissent of Abraham Foxman, who illustrates the contorted the U.S. debate.) If Israel persists on a path that leads away from an attainable two-state solution, then the U.S. President would be negligent to simply stand by and watch. In the Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace, in which Walt and I participated, this is why we argued:

It must make clear that [the U.S. will] have to act in line with those interests and values and will not support actions and policies by either side that are inconsistent with them. The United States must be willing to use the leverage at its disposal to encourage both sides to come to an agreement. The most important aspect of U.S. leverage is the use of positive incentives in the form of economic, security and diplomatic support to the two parties as they move toward a negotiated agreement. There are times, however, when the use of negative incentives may be necessary and appropriate. Thus, the United States should be prepared to condemn unequivocally actions by either side that violate previous agreements, that are inconsistent with human-rights principles or that present obstacles to productive negotiations for a two-state solution. On occasion, the United States may need to exert pressure by making its support for one or the other party in a given domain conditional on that party’s refraining from actions that undermine the peace process and/or U.S. interests and values. For example, U.S. votes in the UN Security Council, its public statements and its bilateral contacts should all reflect the U.S. national interest in a two-state solution.

Text of the Quartet Statement in Moscow, and Video

The Quartet — UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, US secretary of state Hillary Rodham Clinton, US special envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell, and High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union Catherine Ashton — met in Moscow on March 19 2010. They were joined by Quartet Representative Tony Blair.

This is the text of the statement issued after the meeting:

Reaffirming the fundamental principles laid down in its statement in Trieste on June 26, 2009, the Quartet welcomes the readiness to launch proximity talks between Israel and the Palestinians. The Quartet emphasizes that the circumstances which made it possible to agree to launch the proximity talks be respected.

The proximity talks are an important step toward the resumption, without preconditions, of direct, bilateral negotiations that resolve all final status issues as previously agreed by the parties.

The Quartet believes these negotiations should lead to a settlement, negotiated between the parties within 24 months, that ends the occupation which began in 1967 and results in the emergence of an independent, democratic, and viable Palestinian state living side by side in peace and security with Israel and its other neighbours.

The Quartet reiterates that Arab-Israeli peace and the establishment of a peaceful state of Palestine in the West Bank and Gaza is in the fundamental interests of the parties, of all states in the region, and of the international community. In this regard, the Quartet calls on all states to support dialogue between the parties.

The Quartet reiterates its call on Israel and the Palestinians to act on the basis of international law and on their previous agreements and obligations — in particular adherence to the Roadmap, irrespective of reciprocity — to promote an environment conducive to successful negotiations and re-affirms that unilateral actions taken by either party cannot prejudge the outcome of negotiations
and will not be recognised by the international community.

The Quartet urges the government of Israel to freeze all settlement activity, including natural growth, dismantle outposts erected since
March 2001; and to refrain from demolitions and evictions in East Jerusalem.

The Quartet also calls on both sides to observe calm and restraint and to refrain from provocative actions and inflammatory rhetoric especially in areas of cultural and religious sensitivity. Noting the significant progress on security achieved by the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank the Quartet calls on the Palestinian Authority to continue to make every effort to improve law and order, to fight violent
extremism, and to end incitement.

The Quartet emphasizes the need to assist the Palestinian Authority in building its law enforcement capacity.

Recalling that the annexation of East Jerusalem is not recognised by the international community, the Quartet underscores that the status of Jerusalem is a permanent status issue that must be resolved through negotiations between the parties and condemns the decision by the government of Israel to advance planning for new housing units in East Jerusalem.

The Quartet re-affirms its intention to closely monitor developments in Jerusalem and to keep under consideration additional steps that may be required to address the situation on the ground.

The Quartet recognises that Jerusalem is a deeply important issue for Israelis and Palestinians, and for Jews, Muslims, and Christians and believes that through good faith negotiations the parties can mutually agree on an outcome that realizes the aspirations of both parties for Jerusalem, and safeguards its status for people around the world.

Recalling that transformative change on the ground is integral to peace, the Quartet continues to support the Palestinian Authority's plan of August 2009 for building the Palestinian state within 24 months as a demonstration of Palestinians’ serious commitment to an independent state that provides good governance, opportunity, justice, and security for the Palestinian people from the first day that it is established and is a responsible neighbor to all states in the region.

The Quartet takes positive note of Israel’s steps to ease restrictions of movement in the West Bank and calls for further and sustained steps to facilitate the state building efforts of the Palestinian Authority.

The Quartet endorses fully the efforts of the Quartet Representative in support of Prime Minister Fayyad’s state-building and economic development program which has seen significant improvement in the Palestinian Authority’s performance with respect to security and law and order and improved economic growth.

The Quartet supports the Quartet Representative in his vital efforts to promote change on the ground in aid of the political negotiations.
The Quartet further calls on all states in the region and in the wider international community to match the Palestinian commitment to state-building by contributing immediate, concrete, and sustained support for the Palestinian Authority and, in this regard, looks forward to the upcoming meeting of the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee (AHLC) to coordinate international support for the Palestinian state building effort.

The Quartet is deeply concerned by the continuing deterioration in Gaza, including the humanitarian and human rights situation of the civilian population, and stresses the urgency of a durable resolution to the Gaza crisis.

The Quartet calls for a solution that addresses Israel's legitimate security concerns, including an end to weapons smuggling into Gaza; promotes Palestinian unity based on the PLO commitments and the re-unification of Gaza and the West Bank under the legitimate Palestinian Authority; and ensures the opening of the crossings to allow for the unimpeded flow of humanitarian aid, commercial goods, and persons to and from Gaza, consistent with UN Security Council Resolution 1860.

The Quartet takes positive note that the Israeli government has just communicated its approval of a number of the UN Secretary General’s civilian recovery projects, including a stalled housing project in Khan Younis and looks forward to their early implementation. The Quartet condemns yesterday’s rocket fire from Gaza and calls for an immediate end to violence and terror and for calm to be respected.

The Quartet reiterates its call for the immediate release of Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit.

Recognizing the significance of the Arab Peace Initiative, the Quartet looks forward to closer co-operation with the parties and the Arab League and urges regional governments to support publicly the resumption of bilateral negotiations, enter into a structured regional dialogue on issues of common concern, and take steps to foster positive relations throughout the region in the context of progress towards comprehensive peace on the basis of UN Security Council Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1515, and 1850 and the Madrid principles, including through the conclusion of peace agreements between Israel and Syria and Israel and Lebanon.

The Quartet commits to remain actively involved on all tracks and to encourage and review progress. The Quartet commits to meet regularly and tasks the envoys to intensify their co-operation, to maintain contacts with the Arab League Committee on the Arab Peace Initiative, and to formulate recommendations for Quartet action.

The Quartet re-affirms its previous statements and supports, in consultation with the parties, an international conference in Moscow at the appropriate time concurrent with direct negotiations.

Just released: Israel and Palestine - Two States for Two Peoples: If Not Now, When?

The Boston Study Group on Middle East Peace started its regular meetings in September 2008. Its members all have a strong interest in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Some have been intensely engaged with this subject for decades. Others have closely followed the conflict within the context of their professional work in conflict resolution, international law and international relations, religion and U.S. foreign policy.

The group’s principal contribution is the jointly written policy statement entitled Israel and Palestine—Two States for Two People: If Not Now, When? The statement stands as a collegial, collective enterprise that represents a consensus view of the group.

Prior to drafting the policy statement, each member undertook to research and write a background paper on one of the topics integral to our policy statement. The group as a whole discussed drafts of each of these seven papers (now chapters in this report), thereby benefiting each other with respect to both substance and organization.

Download from the Economist as well.

In your face welcome by Israel is an opportunity for the U.S. to define a firm stance that reflects U.S. interests

Quartet weighs in:

"The "quartet" of Middle East peace mediators -- the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and Russia -- on Friday issued its own condemnation of the settlement plan and said it would assess the situation at a previously scheduled meeting in Moscow next week.

""The Quartet has agreed to closely monitor developments in Jerusalem and to keep under consideration additional steps that may be required to address the situation on the ground," the group said in a statement, without providing further details."

[Former Ambassador Martin Indyk advises Netanyahu, recalling Albright, that he should pay more attention to the U.S. and less to his right wing. Indyk also recalls that the Prime Minister's mishandling mishandling of the U.S. contributed to his defeat by Ehud Barak in 1999. That is a generous reading of the former Clinton adminstration's stance. Recall that while Bill Clinton and Co. were regularly infuriated by Netanyahu, they never really got tough with him. Demonstrations of pique are not getting tough. If you want an example of an administration being tough, you need to go back to Bush/Baker, and there you did have an Israeli Prime Minister going toe-to-toe with the U.S. and losing, literally. Yitzhak Shamir is the case in point.]

[The question that the Obama administration should be asking right now, is not merely how to continue a firm line with a Prime Minister who has no interest in a reasonable two-state solution, but how to insure that his political career is understood by the Israeli public as jeopardizing the only bilateral relationship that really matters to Israel. Netanyahu is not a peacemaker, and to presume that he is only plays into his game.]

Contagion of apology continues: Interior Minister Eli Yishai apologizes for the distress he caused

"If I'd have known, I would have postponed the authorization by a week or two since we had no intention of provoking anyone," Yishai said. "It is definitely unpleasant that this happened during Biden's visit."

In other words, we should have waited two weeks before telling the White House to buzz off.

According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the Prime Minister was displeased at the timing of the announcement by Interior Minister Eli Yishai of Israel's intention to move forward with construction in East Jerusalem. Perhaps. Israeli politicians have grown accustomed to telling the U.S. to buzz off and getting away with it, so Netanyahu was unprepared for the tone of Biden's strong condemnation. Biden has also been intent to continue to drive the point home, and not just by letting the soup cool for 90 minutes: “As we move forward, the United States will hold both sides accountable for any statements or actions that inflame tensions or prejudice the outcome of talks, as this decision did”.

One needs to be very dubious of Netanyahu's commitment to a two-state solution, even if the U.S. continues to press. However, if the U.S. does not press, this venture is going nowhere.

For excellent reportage on recent developments see this from the Economist. The report includes the following:

"...Mr Netanyahu apparently wrung an assurance from the Americans (before Mr Biden’s embarrassment) that concessions offered by his predecessor, Ehud Olmert, to the Palestinians’ president, Mahmoud Abbas, would not mark the point of departure for new negotiations. Instead, the parties will go back to the long-dormant “road map” laid out by George Bush seven years ago. Israel, then led by Ariel Sharon, broadly accepted it but with a long list of reservations."

If true, then Biden's words are only bravado.

Congressman Delahunt blows the whistle on graceless Ayalon

Danny Ayalon, Israel's Deputy Foreign Minister, has once again demonstrated his diplomatic grace. Ayalon honed his skills as the Israeli Ambassador in Washington. In January, he was forced to apologize twice (the first apology was rejected) for his attempt to demean the Turkish Ambassador to Israel. Ayalon's charm offensive continues. He blocked efforts by U.S. Representative Bill Delahunt to hold meetings with Israeli officials. Ayalon, who channels Jabotinsky, was miffed that Delahunt was visiting under the auspices of J Street, the sensible alternative to AIPAC. Ayalon, it should be recalled, spurns the notion that Israel is occupying the West Bank, which he glosses as "disputed territory". He views J Street as "anti-Israel", a perspective shared by the Prime Minister of Israel.

[A bit more on the Delahunt mission here.

["(J-Street) has sparked questions over whether American Jews, who voted overwhelmingly for Obama, should push Israel to accept risks as they bargain with Palestinian leaders.

"“If you are not living in Israel, if you are not serving in the army . . . is that a morally tenable posture to take?’’ said Robert Leikind, director of the American Jewish Committee’s Boston office."

Mr. Leikind thinks U.S. citizens who "really" support Israel have no moral right to a view on what U.S. policy should be vis-a-vis the the Arab-Israeli conflict unless they become Israelis. This is an absurd stance that would disqualify almost any opinion on how the U.S. spends its resources and protects its resources in the world. J-Street argues that the U.S. has a keen interest in a settlement of the core conflict, and if the U.S. needs to use some muscle to implement a solution, then so be it. Mr. Leikind doesn't like that stance.]

Turkey has provided an excellent example for the U.S.

The U.S. enjoys a multitude of means through which to signal its seriousness to Palestinians and Israelis about its goal of ending the occupation and fostering a two-state solution. Leveraging U.S. influence vis-a-vis the Palestinian side is already standard practice, but the tendency has been to stick to rhetoric and diplomatic pressure vis-a-vis Israel. Thus, prior to the disappointing Obama-'Abbas-Netanyahu meeting in New York, the U.S. went ahead with a planned naval exercise with the Israeli military rather than postponing it. As the recent Turkish example illustrates, canceling military exercises pushes Israel's angst meter. Given the extensive ties between the Pentagon and the Israeli military there are many, many ways to signal displeasure, ranging from sending a major instead instead of a general to a planned meeting, postponing joint military exercises, or delaying or even canceling procurement decisions.

If President Obama is serious, he should learn from Turkey's timely wake-up call.

Relevant earlier post.

Stephen Walt's dour assessment of the prospects for a two state solution in Israel-Palestine

Stephen M. Walt -- Will Obama Settle for Failure in the Middle East? - washingtonpost.com

Walt is no doubt correct that the Israeli Prime Minister is playing a familiar string-along game, while the colonization of the West Bank continues relentlessly. For all the hopeful predictions of Netanyahu's "pragmatism" there is no reason to doubt either his deep-seated committed to Zionist Revisionism or his hostility to the premise of an independent Palestine existing side-by-side with Israel.

Walt is also correct to suggest that President Obama is going to have to turn up the heat considerably to attain his stated goal of a two state solution. Will Obama be willing to pay the political price, and is the political price quite as high as Walt suggests? As for the former, we don't know yet. Obama has played his hand very coolly. As for the latter question, might it be that, notwithstanding the formidable AIPAC, the political price has come down a bit. Pro-peace supporters of Israel have supported Obama's firm stance on the settlements. There is evidence to suggest that Israel's image in the eyes of its liberal U.S. supporters has suffered over the past few years. People who freely support to Israel in the past, are now raising questions about Israel's commitment to peace and human rights. (This article in Forward is illustrative of a shift.)

Despite the predictable knee-jerk condemnations of the Goldstone commission's important report, Israel's credibility as a state ready to respect Palestinian rights is in question. Notwithstanding sharp official U.S. comments on the document, the hard-hitting report further diminishes Israel's claims to a morally superior vantage point (remember Barak: "the IDF is most moral army in the world.") The Gaza war report also underlines Israel's dependence on U.S. diplomatic protection, which Netanyahu might be well briefed to remember.

In terms of the dynamics of U.S.-Israeli relations, no Israeli government can afford to jeopardize its relationship with the United States. Although Obama may be unpopular in Israel, there is little doubt that his pressure on Israel has caused many Israelis to worry about the consequences of defying the U.S. president.

One of America's exceptional diplomats reflects on his four decades in the Middle East, including his role in Iraq and Afghanistan

Ryan Crocker is one of those diplomats who hated serving in Washington and yearned to be in the field. He served as U.S. Ambassador in four key countries--Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon and Iraq--and he opened the U.S. Embassy in Kabul in 2001. He has notable comments on the U.S. dialogue with Iran, which ended in the spring of 2003, after a period of important cooperation in Afghanistan, as well as about his service in Iraq.

I first met him almost 30 years when he was Political Officer in Beirut (before his office was blown up when the embassy was destroyed in April 1983). I was immediately impressed by his open mind, his curiosity and his feel for what was going on in Lebanon at the time. I strongly urge that you spend some time reading his reflections.

The explosive Nadav Tamir memo (updated with additional links, including the purported full text)

In a leaked confidential memo Israel's Boston Consul-General Nadav Tamir argues that Israeli obdurate commitment to the construction of illegal settlements is alienating U.S. supporters, especially the crucial American-Jewish community. Tamir argues that the dispute between the U.S. and Israel over settlements is causing strategic harm to Israel, and that Israel is unwise to link itself to domestic U.S. political enemies of Obama. The document, written in Hebrew, was apparently circulated among Israeli diplomats and addressed to the Prime Minister and the Foreign Minister. The memo was dismissed by the Prime Minister's office as "not worthy of a response." Meanwhile, Avigdor Lieberman, has summoned Tamir to the woodshed.

President Obama's focus on finding a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including his demand for a freeze to Israeli settlement construction and expansion, has been castigated by leading members of the pro-Israel PR squad as overambitious and naive. Perhaps the U.S. leader is not being given enough credit for appreciating the dynamics of U.S.-Israeli relations, including the the views of core Jewish supporters regarding Israeli colonization of the West Bank. Certainly, a strong majority of those Jewish Americans who follow developments in the Arab-Israeli zone expect that a two-state solution--if it is still possible--will necessitate a complete or nearly complete evacuation of the settlements.

Prior to his election, it was fairly common to hear the much distrusted Netanyahu described as sleazy but pragmatic (as the late Zeev Schiff once described him to me). Yet, after nearly half a year in office, one hears pragmatism ascribed to Bibi much less frequently. Perhaps Netanyahu is congenitally incapable of reaching a reasonable bargain with his Palestinian counterparts. Perhaps Bibi's dogmatism is more important than his vaunted pragmatism. Nadav Tamir's warning is not merely the considered perspective of a respected Israeli diplomat, but an echo chamber for the worries that I expect he has heard continuously for the past months from Israel's supporters.

As I have noted here before, an Israeli Prime Minister who jeopardizes the U.S.-Israeli relationship will not be treated kindly by the Israeli electorate, or at least that is the lesson from the history of the past few decades. Perhaps the occupant of the White House understands that lesson better than the self-assured Netanyahu. If Netanyahu is incapable of making a reasonable peace, which I believe to be the case, then a policy that exposes the core contradictions in the contending interests of the U.S. and Israel is very wise. There have been moments when the U.S. willingly subordinated its interests to Israel's; this is not one of those moments.

Debra DeLee: Obama means what he says about Israel's illegal settlements. Get used to it.