Walter Armbrust, who knows Egypt quite well, offers a thoughtful essay on the strategy of rope-a-dope strategy of the Egyptian generals.

The essay was published in al-Jazeera English.

It is noteworthy that the satellite TV station al-Fara'ayn, which figures importantly in the essay, apparently has been allowed to re-open after being shut on June 30 for criticism of the army commander.  The station has been a platform for Taufiq 'Ukasha, the Mubarak leftover who has been compared to the U.S. conspiracy monger Glenn Beck.  'Ukasha frequently lambasted President Muhammad Mursi for a surfeit of real and imagined failures and motives.

[With the Constitution suspended, the Ministry of Social Affairs has reclaimed it power to ban NGOs and may seek to move against the MB for its use of violence in defending its Cairo Guidance Bureau from being ransacked by demonstrators.

What are Israeli strategists thinking? One example.

The setting for these remarks was the Herzliya National Security Conference, in early February.  They are reported in Defense News, Feb. 14, 2011, pp. 1 and 8.

Retired U.S. Marine Gen. James Jones, who up until last October served as Obama’s national securi­ty adviser, dismissed claims of Washington’s decline.

“I reject the idea that the United States is in decline or even in rela­tive decline,” Jones told conference participants here. “To be sure, there is much to be done to ensure we are as successful in the 21st century as we were in the 20th ... and Egypt is just a small sign of the potential for change.” Alongside efforts to prevent a nu­clear-armed Iran and to fortify a coalition of the moderates com­prised of pro-Western Arab states respectful of the universal rights of its people, Jones cited the Israeli-Palestinian peace process as “a mat­ter of urgent necessity.” Jones said the lack of a peace deal jeopardizes regional stability by un­dermining moderates, provoking the young and hopeless classes, and empowering Iran.

Time is not on Israel’s side, Jones warned: “The growing isolation of Israel is a very real concern. The number of countries that recognize a Palestinian state can outrank the number of countries that recognize Israel.” Jones urged Israel’s leaders to restart peace negotiations.

“Failure to act could ignite a rep­etition of Egypt on streets in neigh­boring countries,” he said. “Will ex­tremists win the hearts and minds of the young Arab street? Or will moderate voices prevail for a two­state solution? This could be the most important national security question of our time, and if we fail, history will not forgive us.” Amos Gilead, director for politi­cal-military affairs at Israel’s Min­istry of Defense, was brutally direct in rejecting Jones’ premise.

“Even if we sign an agreement to­morrow with the [Palestinian Au­thority], they won’t honor it,” Gilead said. “Look around the Middle East: If there is a democratic process here, it will bring, for sure, hell.” In tactless and borderline racist remarks here, Gilead insisted that democracy and stability cannot co­exist in the Arab Middle East.

“In the Middle East and the Arab world, there is no place for democ­racy,” he said.

Gilead said free elections in the region would breed either a Gaza­like “Hamastan,” or Lebanon, which he described as a so-called democracy.

“In Lebanon, there is a constitu­tion without a state. They have an elected president, prime minister, speaker, but the country is losing it­self when it allows entities more powerful than Lebanon to drive the agenda,” Gilead said, alluding to Hezbollah.

“The only place in the region with a real chance of democracy is Iran,” a non-Arab nation, he said. “But what was the reaction to Iranian democratic forces? Indifference. And so dissenters in Iran got the message and we lost the opportuni­ty to change Iran.”

Timely essay

Adam Shatz offers a perceptive yet skeptical account of the "revolution" in Egypt. Despite the exit of Husni Mubarak, the regime is still very much in place in Egypt.  I hope, and I am sure Shatz does as well, that Egyptians realize the freer, more responsive and more empathetic government that they so richly deserve.  Unfortunately, as I noted here two weeks ago, it is hard to imagine a new power arrangement that fails to accommodate the corporate interests of the Egyptian military.  Shatz makes this point as well.

Given that the military is invested in the geopolitical status quo--including peace with Israel and an annual subvention from the U.S. largess--the generals' tolerance for strategic debate will be limited.  That is probably a good thing.  In addition, the willingness of the military brass to tolerate a free and open political debate remains to be tested.  If reformists start to turn over too many rocks, it is easy to imagine senior officers being very intent to protect their privileges and prerogatives.

The regional upheaval has flummoxed Washington.  Shatz provides a pungent appraisal of the inadequacy of the U.S. strategic and conceptual response.  He also skewers Barack Obama for lacking a strategic vision to match the grandeur of his rhetoric.

Turkey confirms it barred Israel from military exercise because of Gaza war

In recent months, since Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stormed off the stage in Davos in January 2009, Israeli officials have quietly emphasized that they do not consider Turkey a suitable mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict despite Erodogan's offer to play that role. Nonetheless, Israeli officials see their alliance with Turkey as a crucial component in their strategic posture, and they have been loathe to jeopardize the alliance by criticizing Erdogan or Turkey. This apprehension was echoed by Defense Minister Ehud Barak in his reaction to the news that Israel has been disinvited from a military exercise. The Israeli-Turkish alliance has been a strategic priority for Turkey, but Israel's much condemned campaign in Gaza has has sowed anger in Turkey, and any distancing from Israel wins public approval in Turkey.

It is unlikely that the alliance will be abruptly ended by Turkey, but the latest signal from Turkey has apparently discomfited Israeli strategists. Turkey has made its point, which is not a bad thing.

The US and Britain struggle to describe what they hope to accomplish in Aghanistan, but what they seem to seek is beyond their ability to attain.

So argues Rory Stewart in an essay that reflects history's lessons and a familiarity with Afghanistan and its environs. Stewart suggests that the appropriate goal should be development not "governance". He argues for a severe reduction of foreign forces with special ops units tasked to deal with al-Qaeda. He suggests that the Taliban threat, per se, is exaggerated. The reader will recall that Stewart, a former British diplomat, is the author of highly regarded books on Iraq and on Afghanistan.
LRB · Rory Stewart: The Irresistible Illusion

A new U.S. strategy?

The authors, serving officers respectively in the navy and the marines, as well as combat vets, have written a gutsy piece proposing a containment policy to counter al-Qaeda:

"Without a coherent strategy, America's "war on terror" has been tragically inconsistent. We say that our mandate is to spread freedom and democracy, yet we try to do so at the point of a gun. We say that our battle must be fought by a coalition of like-minded allies, but we eschew diplomacy and browbeat our friends when they disagree with us. We say that we stand for the highest human ideals, but the world harbors deep suspicions of our indefinite detentions at Guantanamo.

"Our contradictory words and actions have alienated virtually the entire Arab world. NATO remains fractured and largely ineffectual against the resurgent Taliban, and the Washington clock has run out on the Iraq war. We have elevated Al Qaeda's importance to nearly our own, and we are moving into a deadly no-man's-land where America is neither respected nor feared. It is almost inconceivable, and yet it has come to this: We are losing the global influence war to people who blow up women and children at kebab stands."

They propose a patient U.S. policy--not a two-aspirins-at bedtime approach--that puts enormous effort into the political reform of Muslim societies. Implicitly, they are promoting a project of liberalization rather than democratization, which is to say reducing corruption, curtailing human rights abuses and opening up economic opportunities.

This suggested strategy by two experienced officers who have had their boots on the ground is underdeveloped and incomplete, but it underlines the fact that the military "hammer" is not the right tool to solve the problems facing the U.S. in the Muslim world.