Leaked conversation between then soon-to-be-president al-Sisi and high ranking collaborators about shaking down the Gulf Shaykhs and stashing billions in the Army banks accounts

Borzou Daragahi offers an excellent report on the leaked tapes.

The plotters' ridicule of and obvious disdain for the Gulf "half-states" will not play well in Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Leaked conversations in Arabic (with subtitles)

Ahmed Seif, a man of courage and principle, 1951-2014 (R.I.P.)

When I was privileged to meet with Ahmed Seif I was impressed by his energy, his integrity and his selfless commitment to the cause of human rights in Egypt.  His voice is needed as much now as ever as a new dictator repudiates the notion of shared human rights in Egypt.  

"The Massacre One Year Later"

Ahmad Shokar's essay deserves to be read.  It very much relates to my earlier post on the repressive Egyptian regime.

Shokar observes:

The vigorous attempts by state officials, along with media and public figures, to justify the killings are signs that Raba‘a is an enduring trauma whose memory will not be easily expunged. Raba‘a is in fact the pivotal event of Egyptian politics after the coup. Even though, as Mosaab al-Shamy (one of the foremost photographers of the massacre) observed, the state works hard to scrub the public sphere clean of commemorative icons, Raba‘a is far from invisible. As competing narratives are made to serve rival political agendas, the very persistence of contestation over the facts suggests that the massacre will not die along with its victims.

Insights into the Repressive Character of the Government in Egypt

The response of the Egyptian government to the investigative report "All According to Plan" [حسب الخطة  Arabic link] by Human Rights Watch is extremely revealing and provides insights into the mentality of the al-Sisi regime.  In short, as reported by the flagship al-Ahram, HRW is biased, serves U.S. interests, is in cahoots with the Muslim Brotherhood and had no authority to conduct research in Egypt.  There is a deep-seated suspicion of foreign NGOs in Egypt. I have witnessed it numerous times over the past 35 years.

The latest episode, of course, serves a double purpose, viz., it stifles open discussion of the report and its serious accusations that Field Marshal al-Sisi sits at the helm of a repressive security apparatus that very likely committed crimes against humanity by conducting deliberate mass killings of demonstrators in 2013 following the toppling of Muhammad Mursi as President; and, it serves to warn indigenous rights oriented groups that--unlike HRW officials--they cannot escape reprisal arrests, torture and jail.  You can be sure that while many educated Egyptians with social media access are well aware of the HRW report, but would also confirm that the message to tread very carefully is indelibly received.

The government reaction is addressed by Egyptian Chronicles.

Even in comparison with the worst years of the Mubarak era, this is a very dark chapter in Egypt's modern history.

For official statements in Arabic.

Urban Backlash against Democracy: Battling the Tyranny of the Majority or the Rise of Rural Power?

Robert Bianchi, author of the still rewarding and remarkably topical Unruly Corporatism (OUP, 1989), offers an analysis that is incisive and persuasive.  Through an examination of the election results in 2011 and 2012, he demonstrates that Mohammed Mursi and the Ikhwan's Freedom and Justice Party enjoyed a deep level of support among its sizable but comparatively disadvantaged constituency.  The electoral results correspond to the deep divisions between the Egyptian geographic and economic peripheries and the relatively affluent urban and provincial middle and working classes, not to mention privileged elites who benefited significantly from the pre-revolutionary status quo and strongly supported General Ahmed Shafiq's campaign for the presidency.  The upshot of Bianchi paper is that notwithstanding the propaganda of the al-Sisi regime, one easily surmises that Egypt remains a deeply cleaved society and that the base constituencies of the Ikhwan remain.

'Ammar al-Zu'bi in al-Jazeera (Arabic)

How long will the honeymoon last in Egypt? Will the security apparatus be able to thwart a divorce?

"Sisi’s gamble requires that he figure out a workable formula for ruling Egypt without the participation of Egyptians, at a historical juncture when Egyptians have become much harder to rule."  "Baheyya"

Does the field marshal have a sense of humor?

Oum Cartoon offers thoughtful commentary on Egypt through the eyes of local cartoonists.  The site deserves your time.

Using telepathic voting nearly 24 million Egyptians elect coup-leader Field Marshal al-Sisi in a landslide.

Although credible observers put turnout in this week's election at well less than 15%, Egyptian officials claim that 46% of eligible voters turned out to vote.  Some newspapers, such as al-Akhbar report even higher figures.  Skeptical observers such as the Guardian's David Hearst clearly failed to take into account innovative telepathic voting, which frees voters from the burden of standing in annoying queues.  The technique was so successful that there no annoying queues.

In contrast to Pew polling, which indicated that 54% of Egyptians held positive views of the al-Sisi, 96.9% of Egyptian voters actually cast votes for Field Marshal Abdul Fattah al-Sisi.  So much for the accuracy of polls.  Then again, could it be that only the pro al-Sisi voters showed up to vote? 

In December I wrote the following in Current History: 

After decades of enjoying unchecked political prerogatives, not to mention opportunities for corruption, the denizens of the state who view democracy as an affront to their privileges have taken nearly every possible to ensure the failure of the democratic, and to discredit the very idea of democracy.

The May 2014 presidential election illustrates the point.  A more recent essay by Tareq Ali is apposite.  [Added: Timely analyses at Middle East Eye; and see this edifying NYTimes piece by David Kirkpatrick.]

[It is announced that al-Sisi received 24 million votes.]

"Where are the "votes"?"

Cartoon by Andeel.

The July 3 coup in Egypt: What the law says

Excerpt from the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2012:

Coups d'etat

Sec. 7008. None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made

available pursuant to titles III through VI of this Act shall be obligated or expended to finance directly any assistance to the

government of any country whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup d'etat [added emphasis] or decree or, after the date of enactment of this Act, a coup d'etat or decree in which the military plays a decisive role: 

Provided, <> That assistance may be resumed to such government if the President determines and certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that subsequent to the termination of assistance a democratically elected government has taken office: Provided further, That the provisions of this section shall not apply to assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic <> processes: 

Provided further, That

[[Page 125 STAT. 1196]]

funds made available pursuant to the previous provisos shall be subject to the regular notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations.

What the White House says:

"I'm being very clear with you ... this is a complex and difficult issue with significant consequences," Carney said during his daily briefing, the first since Egypt's military ousted Morsi nearly a week ago. Calling the action a coup could cut off more than $1.5 billion in annual U.S. foreign aid for Egypt.
But the Obama administration is reluctant to cut off aid. "We think it would not be in the best interests of the United States" to change its aid program at this time, Carney said. Asked if that would mean the administration would be cutting off aid in the near-term, Carney repeated his response: "we think that would not be in our best interests." 

The Egyptian Army is not an instrument of either reform or democracy

The Egyptian Army is not a democratic institution despite its recent pretensions.  One only needs to recall following the ouster of Mubarak for a reminder of how quickly the Army's penchant for autocracy surfaces.  Today's slaughter of scores of apparently innocent civilian protesters underlines the urgency of getting the generals out of the Presidential palace.

Before the situation in Egypt slides further into mayhem, the USG, and not least Obama, needs to grasp that pretending what has happened was not a coup d'état only encourages the generals.  The beginning of an effective policy response is using the word c-o-u-p.  This will oblige the US to suspend military aid and strengthen leverage for moving quickly to a government of national reconciliation.  Now, more than ever, insuring the participation of the MB in such a government is urgent.

The most thuggish institution in Egypt is the police, which has resisted successfully recent attempts at reform.   unless there is an effective establishment of an effective civilian transitional leadership, the police, with the Army's sufferance if not collusion, will return to the business as usual that they know best, namely beating, abusing and arresting anyone who deems to challenge their reign.  

The situation in Egypt threatens to unravel disastrously and compelling US interests demand a firm and unmistakable commitment to inclusive civilian rule in Egypt.  Dawdling only amplifies the long-range risks for the US.

Perceptive OPED by Khaled Abou el-Fadl, "Perils of a People's Coup."

[Also see the concise analysis of Prof. Yoram Meital, a serious student of Egypt, and Sarah Carr's powerful reflection, "On Sheep and Infidels".]

Walter Armbrust, who knows Egypt quite well, offers a thoughtful essay on the strategy of rope-a-dope strategy of the Egyptian generals.

The essay was published in al-Jazeera English.

It is noteworthy that the satellite TV station al-Fara'ayn, which figures importantly in the essay, apparently has been allowed to re-open after being shut on June 30 for criticism of the army commander.  The station has been a platform for Taufiq 'Ukasha, the Mubarak leftover who has been compared to the U.S. conspiracy monger Glenn Beck.  'Ukasha frequently lambasted President Muhammad Mursi for a surfeit of real and imagined failures and motives.

[With the Constitution suspended, the Ministry of Social Affairs has reclaimed it power to ban NGOs and may seek to move against the MB for its use of violence in defending its Cairo Guidance Bureau from being ransacked by demonstrators.

The July 3 Coup

For the opponents of Muhammad Mursi and the Brotherhood this is a moment of euphoria.  But, the moment is unlikely to be followed by significant improvement in economic conditions.  Moreover, there is a high risk of a return to authoritarian rule. While many Egyptians celebrate the coup, it is prudent to be  deeply distrustful of the Egyptian generals and their motives.  They have been the power behind the curtains for decades, and they have consistently acted to protect their sacrosanct budget and privileges.  Their notion of tutelary or guided democracy is a recipe for continued stagnation and repression. 

Mursi was a lousy president; he was not up to the job and he imprudently over-reached.  Yet, much of the bureaucracy, not least the police and the army, willfully thwarted his power and hastened his failure.  When Mursi attempted to engage in dialogue with his opponents in 2012 (pre-empting an Army initiative), the generals let the opposition know that they should not play.

It is very troubling that the generals have not only dumped Mursi, but have now gone after the senior MB leadership, and much of the second tier leadership.  Many will be charged with crimes, apparently.  This may be preliminary to re-criminalizing the MB, which would be reckless. 

A significant percentage of the voting public will support the MB in future elections. This suggests that the only way to preclude their winning future elections may be to return to Mubarak-era policies of preemptive arrests, voter suppression and manufactured electoral results.

Meantime, the anti-Mursi opposition has demonstrated little ability to organize politically versus mobilizing protests.  Indeed, the only group, other than the MB, with a serious nation-wide organization happens to be al-Nour, the Salafist party (which has aligned momentarily with the Army against Mursi).  The social and cultural views of the Salafists make the MB look moderate by comparison.

Of course, the alternative to the coup would have been for millions of Egyptians to continue to suffer under Mursi's inept rule, and to work for a shift in the power balance through parliamentary elections scheduled previously postponed to this autumn.  That is not appealing advice for people who abhor the MB and who are living through very difficult times, but I suggest that it would have been the wiser course if the generals really were intent on preserving the "January 25 Revolution."  

[Please also read the eminently sensible piece by Emile Nakhleh.  He urges a firm policy response by the Obama Adminstration, including a clearly-stated demand that the Egyptian military allow the acting president a free hand to shepherd a process of national reconciliation.]

Adel Imam is serious comedian who is a household name in Egypt. He has just been sentenced in absentia to three months of jail time, with hard labor, for offending Islam in a couple of recent films.

Adel Imam's films.

Comments here on Egypt

“Sentiments vs. Advice” (Jan. 31, 2011)

On the military’s corporate interests (Feb. 4, 2011)

On the evolution of the Ikhwan (Feb. 4, 2011)

Generals out of the shadows (Feb. 11, 2011)

“Quest for Dignity” with Emile Nakhleh (Mar. 3, 2011)

Nakhleh and Norton on the Egyptian election

"Both the security forces and senior US officials are apprehensive that this week’s elections will bring the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood to power, and there is little doubt that the Brotherhood is poised to win a plurality of seats this week and in run-offs scheduled for December and January. But rather than trying to dilute the election results through military diktat, the United States should insist that the security forces honor the results and hand over power.
"Misplaced fears about the implications of an Islamist sweep are often heard in Washington, where some media pundits have asked whether the Arab Spring is devolving into an Islamist Winter. But Tunisia’s election provides an instructive model on an alternative to that scenario. The election fostered a coalescence of Islamist and secular politicians. The victory of the Tunisian al-Nahda party, which won a 40-percent plurality, may be a harbinger for the coming of Arab political normalcy and the delegitimization of “Arab exceptionalism.’’ Al-Nahda’s leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, has begun reaching out to secular groups to form a coalition government, a move that would not have happened before the demise of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya."

[Because of the Thanksgiving holiday, this piece went to press five days ago.]


On November 25, 2011, a White House statement suggested impatience with the Egyptian generals' and emphasized the goal of "the full transfer of power to a civilian government."  Compare this statement to the President's phone conversation with Field Marshal Tantawi on October 24, 2011.

The Prisoner: testifying to the immensity of what has happened in Egypt.

Egypt's military seeks to institutionalize its independent status and privilege. In effect, the generals are moving to explicitly specify that the military is not subordinate to civilian authority.

As I noted here months ago, the generals were unlikely to accept any reforms that abridge their privileges or subordinate the military to civilian control.  The toppling of Husni Mubarak was an incredible feat, but the military's influence on Egyptian politics remains a constant.  The difference is that much of its influence was exercised behind the curtains in the past, but now the military's controlling hand is more visible.  This may represent progress on the path of reform, but it is well short of the revolution that young Egyptians hope to achieve.

Egypt's Christian minority after the Imbaba clashes

This essay in the NY Review of Books offers a good sampling of Coptic concerns about the rising profile of Egyptian Islamist groups, including Salafists, as well as efforts by the Ikhwan to mitigate those concerns.


However, there is one error in the piece by Yasmine el-Rashidi, namely that the author asserts that Rafiq Habib, the Christian intellectual who was an original member of Hizb al-Wasat and is now aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood, is challenging his father, the Bishop Samuel Habib.

She writes: "Many say Habib likes to provoke his father, a conservative Christian preacher." 

This cannot be so, on this plane of existence at least, because Samuel Habib died in 1997.  I interviewed the elder Habib in the 1990s.


Excerpts from my interview with the younger Habib appear in my contribution to Remaking Muslim Politics.  The contents of the chapter are found here.

Egyptians' negative views of the U.S. "reward" longstanding U.S. fixation on stability at the expense of reform; negative attitudes on peace with Israel are no surprise to anyone who knows Egypt

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From Washington Post