"The Massacre One Year Later"

Ahmad Shokar's essay deserves to be read.  It very much relates to my earlier post on the repressive Egyptian regime.

Shokar observes:

The vigorous attempts by state officials, along with media and public figures, to justify the killings are signs that Raba‘a is an enduring trauma whose memory will not be easily expunged. Raba‘a is in fact the pivotal event of Egyptian politics after the coup. Even though, as Mosaab al-Shamy (one of the foremost photographers of the massacre) observed, the state works hard to scrub the public sphere clean of commemorative icons, Raba‘a is far from invisible. As competing narratives are made to serve rival political agendas, the very persistence of contestation over the facts suggests that the massacre will not die along with its victims.

The July 3 Coup

For the opponents of Muhammad Mursi and the Brotherhood this is a moment of euphoria.  But, the moment is unlikely to be followed by significant improvement in economic conditions.  Moreover, there is a high risk of a return to authoritarian rule. While many Egyptians celebrate the coup, it is prudent to be  deeply distrustful of the Egyptian generals and their motives.  They have been the power behind the curtains for decades, and they have consistently acted to protect their sacrosanct budget and privileges.  Their notion of tutelary or guided democracy is a recipe for continued stagnation and repression. 

Mursi was a lousy president; he was not up to the job and he imprudently over-reached.  Yet, much of the bureaucracy, not least the police and the army, willfully thwarted his power and hastened his failure.  When Mursi attempted to engage in dialogue with his opponents in 2012 (pre-empting an Army initiative), the generals let the opposition know that they should not play.

It is very troubling that the generals have not only dumped Mursi, but have now gone after the senior MB leadership, and much of the second tier leadership.  Many will be charged with crimes, apparently.  This may be preliminary to re-criminalizing the MB, which would be reckless. 

A significant percentage of the voting public will support the MB in future elections. This suggests that the only way to preclude their winning future elections may be to return to Mubarak-era policies of preemptive arrests, voter suppression and manufactured electoral results.

Meantime, the anti-Mursi opposition has demonstrated little ability to organize politically versus mobilizing protests.  Indeed, the only group, other than the MB, with a serious nation-wide organization happens to be al-Nour, the Salafist party (which has aligned momentarily with the Army against Mursi).  The social and cultural views of the Salafists make the MB look moderate by comparison.

Of course, the alternative to the coup would have been for millions of Egyptians to continue to suffer under Mursi's inept rule, and to work for a shift in the power balance through parliamentary elections scheduled previously postponed to this autumn.  That is not appealing advice for people who abhor the MB and who are living through very difficult times, but I suggest that it would have been the wiser course if the generals really were intent on preserving the "January 25 Revolution."  

[Please also read the eminently sensible piece by Emile Nakhleh.  He urges a firm policy response by the Obama Adminstration, including a clearly-stated demand that the Egyptian military allow the acting president a free hand to shepherd a process of national reconciliation.]

Reprehensible repression in Saudi Arabia: five to ten year sentences for encouraging protests on Facebook

[Added: HRW offers more detail on the case:

"In the court judgment, which Human Rights Watch obtained, the charges against the seven varied. But the court convicted them all of joining Facebook pages to “incite protests, illegal gathering, and breaking allegiance with the king” and of “assisting and encouraging these calls and corresponding with the [Facebook pages’] followers and concealing them.” All seven were also convicted of violating article 6 of the Anti-Cyber Crime Law, which prohibits producing, sending, or storing any material via an information network that “harms public order.”
"The court imposed its harshest sentence – 10 years in prison – on Abd al-Hamid al-Amer. Prosecutors accused him of founding two Facebook groups, through which he allegedly “conscripted others to join the movements” and “gave them ideas and guidance on the important sites in which to protest and set the timing [of the protests].”
"None of the charges accused the seven of using or advocating violence, as the presiding judge confirmed in the judgment, saying, “Breaking allegiance [with the king] comes by way of arms and it comes by way of protests, marches, and writing articles and publications … the behavior of the [second] course … is sometimes the more dangerous and more malicious method.”"]

Press freedom in Turkey has been impaired and threatened by the actions of PM Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's government

The Committee to Protect Journalists has published a report detailing the jailing and intimidation of journalists.  The full report, Turkey's Press Freedom Crisis, is downloadable here.

IDF lt. colonel responds to peaceful protest

[Added: more information on the incident and other videos]

Al-Jazeera Documentary: Shouting in the Dark (shown in August several times on the English al-Jazeera but not the Arabic station).

Scheduled rebroadcasts have been pulled without explanation; however, the complete documentary is on Facebook.  See the NYTimes coverage, and also see Religion and Politics in Bahrain.

The potentate's response: "Slander and lies".  You judge.

[Feb. 24, 2014: The film is not available to U.S. viewers on either al-Jazeera or for free on Facebook; however, it may be rented for $2.99 at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lmg1N1AKfFc .]

Emile Nakhleh's seminal study of political development in Bahrain has been republished with a new and substantive preface.

Highly recommended.

"Contrary to Saudi and Bahraini government claims, calls for reform are not a Shia thing or a recipe for sectarianism. Media reports indicate the sectarianism argument has been pushed by the Saudi and Bahraini leadership in order to justify their actions against Bahraini peaceful protesters. Many Bahrainis view the main goal of the Saudi presence in the country is to persecute the Shia community and silence all opposition voices. 
"The three key ingredients of the envisioned compromise involve a return to the 1973 constitution, a re-establishment of a popularly elected national Assembly, which the king’s father dissolved in 1975, and dissolving the current government, which has been headed by the king’s uncle, Shaykh Khalifa, since independence in 1971. The prime minister is perhaps the most disliked senior member of Al Khalifa because of perceived corruption, nepotism, and repression, according to academic analysis and media reports. Many Bahrainis also view him as a staunch opponent to reform within the ruling family. The opposition movement maintains that implementing these demands will lead to transparent and accountable government, a just distribution of wealth, recognition of freedoms of speech, assembly, and the press, and an independent judiciary." 

Bahrain: Physicans for Human Rights publish carefully documented report revealing systematic attacks against medical personnel, among many troubling findings

April 22, 2011 Report: Do No Harm: a Call for Bahrain to End Systematic attacks on Doctors and Patient

Missing medical personnel.

Bahrain's Ambassador to the U.S. should read the report.

UAE moves against respected Jurist Association after it calls for political reforms in a mild petition

My comment on a skewed and misleading analysis of the Saudi role in Bahrain

JULIETTE KAYYEM (“Bahrain is the line in the sand,’’ Op-ed, April 9) informs Globe readers that Iran is seen as “a guiding force’’ in the Arab uprisings, especially in Bahrain. There is no credible evidence that Iran guided, planned, or inspired the peaceful demonstrations that began in mid-February, notwithstanding the sometime shrill claims of the Bahraini monarch and his entourage. It is striking that Kayyem, a former official in the Department of Homeland Security, has nothing to say about the economic despair and discrimination that afflict the majority of Bahrain’s population — factors that lent impetus to the protests but that have been minimized by the rulers.

Kayyem makes the odd claim that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates intervened after an opportunity for reform had been missed. It is quite likely that the Saudi-led intervention was precisely intended to sabotage US-encouraged reforms. The Saudi monarchy has long been committed to quashing reform, both inside the kingdom and in the smaller states of the Gulf, not least in its Bahraini dependency.

The repression, censorship, and punitive policies now being pursued in Bahrain may open up opportunities for Iranian meddling, but this will stem from the avoidance of reform, not from people peacefully seeking better treatment from their government.

From king to potentate: the retrograde journey of Hamad ibn Isa Al Khalifa

With no lack of coaching from Riyadh, Bahrain's government moves to ban two moderate opposition political societies.  The largest of two, al-Wefaq, holds 18 of the 40 seats in Bahrain's lower house or Council of Representatives.  Al-Wefaq is led by the soft-spoken and moderate Shaikh 'Ali Salam.  I will post some comments from my discussion with him later.

[Unusually detailed report on the BBC.]

ICG report on Bahrain deserves your attention

"The military intervention and Bahrain’s subsequent tough line have made peaceful resolution of the country’s political crisis immensely more difficult and the regional context significantly tenser. It is unclear how meaningful, peaceful dialogue can be resumed, but it is long overdue and remains absolutely necessary. Given the level of distrust, involvement of a credible third party facilitator appears to be both essential and urgent. The goal would be to work out a plan for gradual but genuine reform toward a constitutional monarchy, with real parliamentary powers and redress of sectarian discrimination. In this context, Saudi Arabia and the other contributing Gulf states should withdraw their security forces and equipment from the island. Protesters should continue to use peaceful means to express their grievances and demands while agreeing to negotiate with the regime.

"As for the U.S., anxious about its relationship with Saudi Arabia and the GCC, it nonetheless should understand that repression in Bahrain will do neither it nor its allies any good in the longer term. Bahrain’s post-colonial history lends at least some hope to the possibility of dialogue and compromise, as despite its obvious problems the country has also known a degree of pluralism and a vibrant civil society. But the window of opportunity is fast closing."

Syria: Ongoing repression on display, including an apparently fabricated "news" clip from the al-Umari Mosque in Dir'aa

Syria has responded to demonstrations and unrest in Dir'aa and surrounding towns with a campaign of arrests targetting some bloggers and demonstrators.  Note the clip of flash arrests by a caravan of state security agents.

Egypt's Security Apparatus

Thugs attack Ayman Nour in Hurghada: standard--state encouraged--practice for dealing with dissidents in Egypt

Dina Guirguis, Executive Director of Voices for a Democratic Egypt, reports in an email on October 24, 2009:

"At the conclusion of a tour conducted by former presidential candidate Ayman Nour of towns and cities in the Red Sea governorate, a brutal assault by "thugs" occurred this evening (Cairo time) on Nour and his associates as they were exiting a restaurant in the Sheraton Street in the Red Sea town of Hurghada. The assailants attacked Nour's press secretary, Ahmed Abdel Gawad, who was accompanying Nour, with canes, and attempted to steal and confiscate his camera and documents in his possession. The restaurant owner intervened by bringing Nour and his party back into the restaurant and securing the restaurant against the assailants' entry.

"As of now, the assailants are surrounding the restaurant and are chanting pro Mubarak slogans. Some of the assailants have been identified by some Al Ghad party members in Hurghada as NDP affiliates.

"Attempts by Nour to contact the police and the prosecutor's office are to no avail, and despite the call for assistance to various law enforcement agencies, no police or officials have responded.

"At this time, Nour and his party remain trapped in the restaurant. Nour has stated he will remain inside until there is a response from the Hurghada General Prosecutor's office. Nour and his party remain endangered.

Later the same day:

"A showdown which lasted an hour and half between assailants identified (by Al Ghad Hurghada members) as NDP affiliates and former presidential candidate Ayman Nour and his associates, which included a US citizen, has concluded. Reportedly, up to 500 Hurghada residents turned out in the street in which the restaurant where Nour and his associates were taking cover is located, and demonstrated in support of Nour, outnumbering the assailants, and forcing security to intervene.

"Security forces have now safely escorted Nour and his associates to the airport, where they are scheduled to depart to Cairo on a flight at 1 am Cairo time. Nour supporters and political activists are gathering at the airport in Cairo to express solidarity with Nour and his associates upon their arrival."

Also see bikyamasr.

Laura Secor on Iran's show trials

The spectacle of Iran's inept trials may well be the image that survives this summer. We watched a ruling apparatus committed first and foremost to its survival and so blinded by its ideological posturing that it is probably incapable of understanding how contemptible it appeared not just to western audiences but to Third world opinion.

There will be much to discuss after the August doldrums, including the hardening of the U.S. policy orientation to Iran. The U.S. will squeeze harder on Iran for a variety of reasons, including: the Iran's unimpeded nuclear program, Iran's spurning of the U.S. offer to dance, and the need to compensate Israel for something that looks like a freeze in the continuing expansion and construction of illegal settlements. No doubt, there will be an attempt for a tougher UNSC resolution, as well as an effort to exploit Iran's dependence on imported gasoline.

Has former Iranian President Muhammad Khatami found his voice?

While he was President Khatami established a penchant for backing away from conflict, particularly after he promised that he take a decisive stand. The courageous dissident Akbar Ganji once told me that the reformists were willing to pay the price for changing the system, but that Khatami had "spent them too cheaply".

In recent weeks, he has spoken out with unaccustomed candor, as the following statement illustrates:

"If you want to calm the atmosphere, why are you carrying out mass arrests? Oppressing people will not help end the protests," Khatami said.

Addressing the judiciary, he said: "If these people have committed crimes, why are their legal rights as citizens not preserved, why don't they have access to a lawyer, why are they not tried in a court, why haven't they been charged?"

Khatami added: "Obtaining confessions in front of cameras is a useless old method ... confessions under pressure are not valid."

Perhaps he has finally found his voice.