The July 3 Coup

For the opponents of Muhammad Mursi and the Brotherhood this is a moment of euphoria.  But, the moment is unlikely to be followed by significant improvement in economic conditions.  Moreover, there is a high risk of a return to authoritarian rule. While many Egyptians celebrate the coup, it is prudent to be  deeply distrustful of the Egyptian generals and their motives.  They have been the power behind the curtains for decades, and they have consistently acted to protect their sacrosanct budget and privileges.  Their notion of tutelary or guided democracy is a recipe for continued stagnation and repression. 

Mursi was a lousy president; he was not up to the job and he imprudently over-reached.  Yet, much of the bureaucracy, not least the police and the army, willfully thwarted his power and hastened his failure.  When Mursi attempted to engage in dialogue with his opponents in 2012 (pre-empting an Army initiative), the generals let the opposition know that they should not play.

It is very troubling that the generals have not only dumped Mursi, but have now gone after the senior MB leadership, and much of the second tier leadership.  Many will be charged with crimes, apparently.  This may be preliminary to re-criminalizing the MB, which would be reckless. 

A significant percentage of the voting public will support the MB in future elections. This suggests that the only way to preclude their winning future elections may be to return to Mubarak-era policies of preemptive arrests, voter suppression and manufactured electoral results.

Meantime, the anti-Mursi opposition has demonstrated little ability to organize politically versus mobilizing protests.  Indeed, the only group, other than the MB, with a serious nation-wide organization happens to be al-Nour, the Salafist party (which has aligned momentarily with the Army against Mursi).  The social and cultural views of the Salafists make the MB look moderate by comparison.

Of course, the alternative to the coup would have been for millions of Egyptians to continue to suffer under Mursi's inept rule, and to work for a shift in the power balance through parliamentary elections scheduled previously postponed to this autumn.  That is not appealing advice for people who abhor the MB and who are living through very difficult times, but I suggest that it would have been the wiser course if the generals really were intent on preserving the "January 25 Revolution."  

[Please also read the eminently sensible piece by Emile Nakhleh.  He urges a firm policy response by the Obama Adminstration, including a clearly-stated demand that the Egyptian military allow the acting president a free hand to shepherd a process of national reconciliation.]

Resurgent Arab Islam need not be unsettling

Resurgent Arab Islam need not be unsettling

By Emile Nakhleh and Augustus R. Norton

[Cross-posted with "Informed Comment: Global Affairs" and Boston Globe's "The Angle", where it was first published December 11, 2011]

In the wake of the youth-directed “Arab Spring,” which rocked the Middle East to its core and felled autocratic governments in several countries, Islamic political parties are poised for an historic resurgence across the region — and that is neither surprising nor necessarily alarming.

Popular mass demonstrations, “Days of Rage,” have been the hallmarks of the season that dislodged dictators in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, and exposed the fragility of fierce but unpopular regimes across the Arab world. Youthful demonstrators in quest of dignity, hungry for jobs, and fed up with corruption formed the vanguards.

But because Arab rulers did not allow serious opposition parties, the best organized opposition groups were often Islamist movements. While they did not launch the Arab Spring, they lent resilience and discipline to the demonstrations. These movements are deeply insinuated in the contours of daily life in Arab societies, and now are emerging as early victors in what Arabs are calling al-sahwa (the awakening).

The successes of Islamic parties inspire consternation and alarm in some US policy circles. Daniel Byman of the Brookings Institution worries that these parties will not embrace democracy. Like former Israeli defense minister Moshe Arens, he suggests that the Arab Spring is likely to become a long Arab Winter as Islamic parties gain power and then thwart hopes for substantial reforms and freedom. But these groups are not the extremists that critics fear, and Islamist political parties deserve the opportunity to deliver on the mandate they’ve been granted at the polls.

Ashraf el-Sherif offers an informed assessment of Egypt's Salafists, including their goals and ambitions

David Ignatius on deliberations within the U.S. intelligence community on talking to groups that lots of people love to hate

Ignatius captures a debate that has gathered momentum within official policy circles. The reality is that as much as special interest advocates would like to dismiss groups such as Hezbollah and Hamas as simply terrorist groups, these groups have significant and sometimes impressively broad and diverse constituencies. In both Palestine and Lebanon the Islamists are a big part of the political landscape and to pretend that they may be excluded from politics or that the issues that they espouse may be ignored is no very smart.

Much of the commentary on the role of Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt fails to appreciate the debates and developments that have been underway within the Brotherhood and on its margins.

My study of Hizb al-Wasat may provide some timely background on the debates, the role of the government and the ideological and inter-generational debates. The study appears in Remaking Muslim Politics, a volume edited by Robert W. Hefner, which is published by Princeton University Press in 2005.

This 2002 article may also be helpful.

See this recent post as well.

[Added on February 7, 2011:

Daniela Pioppi, on the Islamist Alternative in Egypt; and Carrie Rosefsky Wickham on the Ikhwan.  Pioppi offers a scholarly assessment, which ends on a note of pessimism regarding the Ikhwan's capacity and political health.  As such, her assessment is complementary to the far more extensive as yet unpublished work of Ashraf el-Sherif, who I have referenced here before.  The timely Wickham piece is a concise and informed summary of the political evolution of the Ikhwan from its founding to the present.  Other than getting the date wrong for the emergence of Hizb al-Wasat (it is 2005, not 2006; the party first sought legal status in 2006 but the origins are in late 2005) is a useful precis.  Wickham's closing sentences:

"With a track record of nearly 30 years of responsible behavior (if not rhetoric) and a strong base of support, the Muslim Brotherhood has earned a place at the table in the post-Mubarak era. No democratic transition can succeed without it."]


[Added Feb. 12, 2011: Essam el-Errian on what the Brothers want.]

This January 2007 piece by Hala Mustafa and I deals with Egyptian regime strategy for dealing with liberal opposition groups.

Excerpt:

"Today, Egypt’s non-Islamist opposition finds that nearly any serious effort to organize politically is snuffed out by the regime, and access to the statecontrolled media is typically prevented. Why is this so? Because, as in other Middle Eastern countries, Islamists are unlikely to be regarded by the United States and other major Western powers as a palatable alternative to the existing regimes. So who cares if they are afforded space in the arena of ideas? This allows government officials to wag their fingers at the Americans, mumble “Hamas,” and say, “Is that what you want?” It suits the interests of the rulers that the Americans should hear only one credible voice in opposition, uttering views that are
considered dangerous. The legitimation of thoughtful, committed, liberal reformers who give voice to an attractive, secular, alternative view of politics is to be avoided at all costs."

Will Islamist groups take over in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere? U.S. scholars think not.

Alternatives to Hamas: Be careful what you wish for...

British Foreign Secretary offers a reasoned and impressive call for political dialogue with Muslim majority governments and organizations

David Miliband, an articulate and engaging speaker, delivered this talk to the Oxford Centre for Islamic Studies (video excerpt). The thread that ran through the presentation was a commitment to political dialogue, including with those groups or governments that avow ideologies that may conflict with our own. He emphasized that such dialogue is conditioned upon an embrace of politics rather than a commitment to violence intended to destroy the political process.
The q+a session is not reproduced on the ministry website. Miliband was asked several interesting questions, including whether the two European permanent members of the U.N. Security Council should give up a seat to allow a major Muslim country to enjoy permanent member on the Council. He replied that if dialogue is to take place then it would not make sense to exclude the U.K. Asked about Israeli settlements in the West Bank and their long-term status he noted that the British government referred to them as "illegal Israeli settlements." He emphasized the steps that Britain has taken to insure that British imports do not include goods produced in the illegal settlements. He was reminded of colonial era British understandings with Pushtun tribes that allowed them to retain arms and he seemed to agree that these understandings added to the complexities of the Pakistan situation. When asked about Hamas he seemed at pains to color within the lines: He endorsed Egyptian efforts to pursue Palestinian reconciliation, underlined that the PA was the responsible body for conducting negotiations, and described Hamas as not accepting a two-state solution (which is factually debatable).

Newsroom

"What I want to argue today is that the central task for foreign policy is the creation of arenas of politics, national and international, in which different values and ideas can be argued out, and in the process recourse to violence marginalized; and that the central danger is the failure to create such arenas, with consequent strengthening of those committed to violence."

........

"That means being prepared to encourage reconciliation with organisations whose values we may not share but who are prepared to pursue common interests."

Adam Shatz: The Clarion Fund and its Obsession

As many of you know, in recent weeks a shadowy group tied to the tax-exempt Clarion Fund have circulated 28 million copies of "Obsession", a 2006 video. The video is designed to heighten fears about violent Muslims and raise the alarm about "radical Islam."

The film is complementary to efforts by other activists to alert the public of "Islamo-facism," a term that is indiscriminately applied to denote a variety of Muslim groups and activities. Shatz has done a bit of detective work to determine who stands behind the Clarion Fund. He notes that the group avoids an express endorsement of John McCain, but its narrative fits well with whispering campaigns intended to lined Barack Obama to Islam and to Muslim extremists. Even so, it remains to be determined whether the group's effort to influence the upcoming U.S. election is a violation of IRS regulations. Tax-exempt groups under section 501 (c) 3 of the IRS Code are specifically prohibited by IRS regulations from seeking to influence political campaigns.

Here is the relevant IRS standard:

"Under the Internal Revenue Code, all section 501(c)(3) organizations are absolutely prohibited from directly or indirectly participating in, or intervening in, any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for elective public office. Contributions to political campaign funds or public statements of position (verbal or written) made on behalf of the organization in favor of or in opposition to any candidate for public office clearly violate the prohibition against political campaign activity. Violating this prohibition may result in denial or revocation of tax-exempt status and the imposition of certain excise taxes."
LRB · Adam Shatz: Short Cuts

Islamists gain power in Kuwaiti elections

Islamists demand new premier » Kuwait Times Website

Readers may download 2000 publication on Hizballah

Hizballah of Lebanon: Extremist Ideals vs. Mundane Politics (A Paper for the Muslim Politics Project) - Council on Foreign Relations[Hezbollah]