"The Massacre One Year Later"

Ahmad Shokar's essay deserves to be read.  It very much relates to my earlier post on the repressive Egyptian regime.

Shokar observes:

The vigorous attempts by state officials, along with media and public figures, to justify the killings are signs that Raba‘a is an enduring trauma whose memory will not be easily expunged. Raba‘a is in fact the pivotal event of Egyptian politics after the coup. Even though, as Mosaab al-Shamy (one of the foremost photographers of the massacre) observed, the state works hard to scrub the public sphere clean of commemorative icons, Raba‘a is far from invisible. As competing narratives are made to serve rival political agendas, the very persistence of contestation over the facts suggests that the massacre will not die along with its victims.

Insights into the Repressive Character of the Government in Egypt

The response of the Egyptian government to the investigative report "All According to Plan" [حسب الخطة  Arabic link] by Human Rights Watch is extremely revealing and provides insights into the mentality of the al-Sisi regime.  In short, as reported by the flagship al-Ahram, HRW is biased, serves U.S. interests, is in cahoots with the Muslim Brotherhood and had no authority to conduct research in Egypt.  There is a deep-seated suspicion of foreign NGOs in Egypt. I have witnessed it numerous times over the past 35 years.

The latest episode, of course, serves a double purpose, viz., it stifles open discussion of the report and its serious accusations that Field Marshal al-Sisi sits at the helm of a repressive security apparatus that very likely committed crimes against humanity by conducting deliberate mass killings of demonstrators in 2013 following the toppling of Muhammad Mursi as President; and, it serves to warn indigenous rights oriented groups that--unlike HRW officials--they cannot escape reprisal arrests, torture and jail.  You can be sure that while many educated Egyptians with social media access are well aware of the HRW report, but would also confirm that the message to tread very carefully is indelibly received.

The government reaction is addressed by Egyptian Chronicles.

Even in comparison with the worst years of the Mubarak era, this is a very dark chapter in Egypt's modern history.

For official statements in Arabic.

Urban Backlash against Democracy: Battling the Tyranny of the Majority or the Rise of Rural Power?

Robert Bianchi, author of the still rewarding and remarkably topical Unruly Corporatism (OUP, 1989), offers an analysis that is incisive and persuasive.  Through an examination of the election results in 2011 and 2012, he demonstrates that Mohammed Mursi and the Ikhwan's Freedom and Justice Party enjoyed a deep level of support among its sizable but comparatively disadvantaged constituency.  The electoral results correspond to the deep divisions between the Egyptian geographic and economic peripheries and the relatively affluent urban and provincial middle and working classes, not to mention privileged elites who benefited significantly from the pre-revolutionary status quo and strongly supported General Ahmed Shafiq's campaign for the presidency.  The upshot of Bianchi paper is that notwithstanding the propaganda of the al-Sisi regime, one easily surmises that Egypt remains a deeply cleaved society and that the base constituencies of the Ikhwan remain.

The July 3 Coup

For the opponents of Muhammad Mursi and the Brotherhood this is a moment of euphoria.  But, the moment is unlikely to be followed by significant improvement in economic conditions.  Moreover, there is a high risk of a return to authoritarian rule. While many Egyptians celebrate the coup, it is prudent to be  deeply distrustful of the Egyptian generals and their motives.  They have been the power behind the curtains for decades, and they have consistently acted to protect their sacrosanct budget and privileges.  Their notion of tutelary or guided democracy is a recipe for continued stagnation and repression. 

Mursi was a lousy president; he was not up to the job and he imprudently over-reached.  Yet, much of the bureaucracy, not least the police and the army, willfully thwarted his power and hastened his failure.  When Mursi attempted to engage in dialogue with his opponents in 2012 (pre-empting an Army initiative), the generals let the opposition know that they should not play.

It is very troubling that the generals have not only dumped Mursi, but have now gone after the senior MB leadership, and much of the second tier leadership.  Many will be charged with crimes, apparently.  This may be preliminary to re-criminalizing the MB, which would be reckless. 

A significant percentage of the voting public will support the MB in future elections. This suggests that the only way to preclude their winning future elections may be to return to Mubarak-era policies of preemptive arrests, voter suppression and manufactured electoral results.

Meantime, the anti-Mursi opposition has demonstrated little ability to organize politically versus mobilizing protests.  Indeed, the only group, other than the MB, with a serious nation-wide organization happens to be al-Nour, the Salafist party (which has aligned momentarily with the Army against Mursi).  The social and cultural views of the Salafists make the MB look moderate by comparison.

Of course, the alternative to the coup would have been for millions of Egyptians to continue to suffer under Mursi's inept rule, and to work for a shift in the power balance through parliamentary elections scheduled previously postponed to this autumn.  That is not appealing advice for people who abhor the MB and who are living through very difficult times, but I suggest that it would have been the wiser course if the generals really were intent on preserving the "January 25 Revolution."  

[Please also read the eminently sensible piece by Emile Nakhleh.  He urges a firm policy response by the Obama Adminstration, including a clearly-stated demand that the Egyptian military allow the acting president a free hand to shepherd a process of national reconciliation.]

Eric Davis on the Ikhwan

What role for the Ikhwan?

I draw readers' attention to Hossam Tommam's timely paper (Arabic version) on the Brotherhood, published (coincidentally) on the first day of protests, January 25, 2011,  by the ever-thoughtful Arab Reform Initiative.  Tommam highlights the recent domination of the Brotherhood's conservative wing, reflecting the Mubarak regime's closing of political avenues and the judgment that the political wing had failed in its project to engage with the political system.  

Term Limits in Egypt

Old hands will remember that Husni Mubarak promised, in 1981, that he would be a one term President. Well, he quickly forgot that promise.

In contrast, the Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood Muhammad Mahdi Akif is vowing to step down in January 2010, a half dozen year after he replaced the former Supreme Guide Ma'moun Hudeibi, who died in January 2004. Hudeibi was one of the old guard. I interviewed him in February 2003, and while he was affable and forthcoming there was no mistaking him for a democrat. In fact, when I asked Hudeibi about the attempt of younger member to create a political party outside of the Ikhwan, he expressed his annoyance at their insolence.

In contrast, Akef has been been much more comfortable with pluralism of opinion within the Ikhwan. While I have not interviewed Akef, I did interview his deputy, Muhammad Habib, and he revealed what certainly sounded like a sincere embrace of democracy as essential for Egypt's development and for the restoration of freedom to the increasingly autocratic state.

It is probably too early to predict who might succeed Akef, although Habib is certainly a front-runner. If Akef follows through on his promise, it will enhance the Ikhwan's reputation, and only underline the calcified regime stultifies politics in Egypt, and undermines the country's vitality. I would not be surprised to see the regime attempting to pressure Akef to stay in place to avoid the bad example.

Surprising times for outlawed opposition - The National Newspaper

Syrian Muslim Brethren weigh in on Lebanon

Ikhwan calls on Qatar to protect Lebanon's Sunnis. Meantime,
Naharnet News Desk
And also see this cross-post.

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Belongs on the Ballot, Not Behind Bars - Forward.com"

Those who do not follow Egyptian politics closely may be tempted to dismiss Essam el-Erian's depiction of the Mubarak regime's disrespect for freedom and the law as exaggerated, but to do so would be quite wrong. The writer is a leading member of the Muslim Brothers (MB), a man respected for his moderation and good sense. His description is measured and quite accurate.

I last lived in Egypt in late 2006 and early 2007, for six months, and I have been there many times over the past decades. There is no doubt that the scope of freedom in Egypt has been steadily constricted particularly since 2001. The insecure and calcified regime that dominates public life is unwilling to tolerate any credible political opposition. No doubt, the Muslim Brothers are the most important opposition movement in the country, as el-Erian notes, but other respectable opposition groups have suffered the same fate as the MB. In addition, even liberal intellectuals are finding themselves tightly monitored and controlled.

The constriction of freedom has often been rationalized as incidental to the puzzle of succession. Gamal Mubarak is widely understood as the likely successor to his father, but one continues to hear reports of unease about the younger Mubarak in important military and security circles. The result is a truly stultifying political environment, one that bears a closer resemblance politically to Soviet satellite countries in Eastern Europe in the 1970s than to a Mediterranean democracy.

Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Belongs on the Ballot, Not Behind Bars - Forward.com"

Egyptian Islamists draft political programme

FT.com / World - Islamists draft political programme

"A fresh wave of Egyptian government crackdowns against the main opposition movement has been directed against a varied range of targets – a students’ “summer camp” on the Mediterranean coast, an evening meeting of senior officials at a businessman’s Cairo residence, and the more typical dawn raids on members’ houses.

"On Wednesday, it was the turn of two members of parliament to be detained.

"The result has been dozens more members of the Muslim Brotherhood finding themselves behind bars in recent weeks. Brotherhood officials say more than 500 members are in detention, including 40 on trial in a military tribunal facing charges of money-laundering and terrorism."

The curtains are drawn open in Egypt (Daily Star, April 4, 2007)

The curtains are drawn open in Egypt

By Hala Mustafa and Augustus Richard Norton

Commentary by Wednesday, April 04, 2007

On March 26, fewer than 1 million Egyptians approved, in a national referendum, momentous changes in their Constitution. Local and international groups and observers dismissed the government's claims that more than 27 percent of all registered voters participated in the vote. Except for the ruling National Democratic party, the referendum was boycotted by virtually all other main organizations, including the Muslim Brotherhood, legal parties such as the Wafd and Tagammu, the Kefaya movement, and a variety of civil society groups and intellectuals.

The amending process might have been used constructively to foster an extended national debate about the nature and contours of the political system that will emerge once President Hosni Mubarak eventually passes from the scene. Instead, the perfunctory parliamentary discussion did not elicit a single substantive change in the draft amendments.

The referendum has revealed the reality of both the Egyptian political scene and US policy in the Middle East. For Egypt, it was a missed opportunity to have more openness in the political system. Instead, the referendum strengthened the system's grip on power, with the risk of fostering more radicals in the generation to come.

The region's regimes are well aware that the United States is burdened with the war in Iraq and is gripped by a contentious domestic debate over American actions in the Middle East. With stability back in vogue, US allies in the region have seized the moment to secure their domination of power. Despite a strongly critical White House statement the day after the embarrassingly-manipulated plebiscite took place, those in power in Cairo remain confident that American words will not be followed by pressure.

The US bases its policy in the region on a false notion of an axis of "moderate" states - especially Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. But the referendum revealed that in their domestic politics, these states are far from moderate. They also happen to pursue regional policies that often undermine rather than complement US interests. Now that this reality is in plain view, perhaps the Bush administration will finally realize that its black-and-white, good-versus-evil view of the region is illusory.

The amendments were significant in their impact on Egyptian political life. The regime's emergency powers, imposed after President Anwar Sadat was assassinated in 1981, have given the government extraordinary leeway to prosecute crimes in security and military courts where there is no effective right of appeal. These are now supplemented by a permanent anti-terrorism provision in the Constitution. As part of the Constitution, the provisions will be difficult to expunge from daily life.

Perhaps the most chilling impact of the new security amendments is the emasculation of existing Articles 41, 44, and 45, which each originate in the liberal 1923 Constitution. These articles protect free speech, privacy and the right of dissent, and they have now been eviscerated.

Equally distressing is the weakening of the judiciary's role in monitoring elections. Egyptian judges have displayed a sometimes remarkable commitment to the rule of law, including overseeing elections. Judicial oversight did not end election fraud but reduced it substantially. In order to ensure judicial oversight of elections, balloting in national elections was organized in stages. As a result of the new amendments, however, the elections will occur on a single day. Instead of judicial oversight there will now be an oversight committee with no clear mandate.
This is the sort of issue that might have been clarified and made much more precise through a serious public debate on the proposed amendments. However, the regime was not willing to allow this.

The amendments also include a ban on religion-based political parties, despite the fact that the Parties Law of 1977 already imposes such a ban. If the government was really serious about keeping religion out of politics, there would have been a simple solution: revising Article 2 of the Constitution that makes Islamic law the main source of legislation. If this had been done in concert with a ban on religion-based parties, the change would have been more coherent. Instead, the government would not even consider touching Article 2, because the state routinely exploits Islam and Islamic symbols as its main points of political reference.

Because the embrace of Islamic law, or Sharia, in the Constitution has not been changed, Egyptian women will remain deprived of their full rights as citizens, especially as the state has tended to accept a conservative interpretation of Sharia when it comes of women. As long as women's rights remain constrained, this will be a source of instability. Women remain less than fully equal citizens, and the amendments, advertised as "promoting democracy," do nothing of the sort on behalf of women.

Egyptians are deeply religious in general, but many prefer that religion remain a private matter, not one for state intervention. Only the Muslim Brotherhood pursues an agenda to bring religion into public life. Many Egyptians are suspicious of groups such as the Brotherhood, which espouse Islamic law as the legal foundation for Egypt. Even so, the new amendment is both vague and sweeping. It was tailored to enable the government to succeed in its power struggle with the Brotherhood, without addressing profoundly important questions about freedom and individual rights, and without pursuing alternative agendas, including liberal solutions for Egypt, which many citizens would applaud. Yet instead of empowering liberal and secular voices that may counterbalance Islamists trends; instead of encouraging Islamist activists to seek political compromise with non-Islamists, the new amendments work against moderate, especially liberal, voices.

We cannot dismiss the possibility that the Muslim Brotherhood may have made a deal with the regime, if not explicitly then tacitly. The Brotherhood's broader regional agenda, as reiterated at a conference in Cairo on March 29, actually overlaps with that of the regime.

Mubarak had intimated that the changes in the presidential election system, enacted nearly three years ago to permit contested presidential elections, would be followed by constitutional amendments to limit an incumbent to two terms (as stipulated before 1981, when he came to power). This revision would have lent some balance to the imposed amendments, but was not included among the numerous amendments.

The path to democracy in Egypt will be a longer journey because of the March 26 referendum. The coming weeks and months will be a time of trial for those intellectuals who claim to be committed to the liberal values that must underpin a democracy. The curtains have been drawn wide open for all to see the political realities of Egypt, and its false moderation. But that was the reality behind the curtain all along.

Hala Mustafa is a writer and the editor of the journal "Democracy" at the Al-Ahram
Foundation in Cairo. Augustus Richard Norton, a professor at Boston University, is the author
of "Hizbullah," just published by Princeton University Press. They wrote this commentary for THE DAILY STAR.

Stacher and Shehata on Ikhwan in Parliament